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**The Co-Development of Self and  
Socio-Moral Emotions during the Toddler Years**

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Profound changes occur in self-awareness during the toddler years. During the second year, children begin to assert their own agency (Mascolo & Fischer, 1998), resist adult intervention, use the words “I” and “me” (Pipp, Fischer & Jennings, 1987), show self-recognition when looking into a mirror (Bertenthal & Fischer, 1978; Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979), and experience early forms of moral and self-conscious emotions (Lewis, 1993; Mascolo & Fischer, 1995; Zahn-Waxler, 1990). As self-awareness develops, the sense of self increasingly functions as a socio-moral guide to action (Tangney, 2002). The self is not simply a cognitive construction: self-awareness is a type of *reflective activity* (Mead, 1934) that coordinates cognitive (Bertenthal & Fischer, 1978), emotional (Emde, 1980), conative (Mayer, Chabot & Carlsmith, 1997) and social (Fogel, 1993; Sarbin & Allen, 1968) elements. Emotions – and particularly self-conscious and moral emotions – are important aspects of developing selves. Self-conscious emotions both *organize* and *are organized by* an individual's evolving capacity to evaluate the self within social contexts. For example, guilt arises in development as children gain the capacity to become aware of having committing a wrongdoing; however, feelings of guilt simultaneously organize and amplify children's sense of responsibility for moral infractions. In this way, self-conscious emotions function as building blocks for the construction of selves.

In this paper, we examine the co-development of socio-moral, self-evaluative emotions and self as they develop in social interactions with parents and other socialization figures. We use dynamic skill theory (Fischer, 1980; Fischer and Bidell, in press; Mascolo & Fischer, 1999; 2004) to chart the emergence and development of guilt, shame and anger over the toddler years. We argue that (a) guilt, shame and anger are socio-moral emotions that develop as children appropriate socio-moral standards from their joint activity with others; (b) experiences of guilt and shame take multiple forms over time; (c) partially internalized forms of guilt and shame can be identified by the third year of life; (d) similar socialization processes underlie the development of guilt, shame and the regulation of anger; (e) socio-moral and self-evaluative

emotions in the toddler years provide a foundation for the construction of moral selves in development.

### **The Concept of Self in Social Context**

In what follows, we define *self* in terms of a child's developing awareness of *I*, *me* or *mine*. From this view, the sense of self consists of a type of *reflective* experience, as expressed in the writings of George Herbert Mead (1934). According to him, the self is born when the process of awareness becomes "an object to itself". The experience of self consists of conscious activity that takes itself as an object. This model of self is depicted in Figure 1. The idea that self-awareness is a type of reflective activity implies the presence of a more primary level of activity that performs the requisite acts of reflection. This activity is represented by the bold arrow indicating primary conscious action operating on social objects. Self-awareness occurs as primary conscious activity loops back upon itself and takes itself as a constructed object of awareness. Self-awareness is indicated in Figure 1 by the reflective looping back of the base arrow upon itself. The process by which this process occurs is a social one. In the example provided in Figure 1, a mother re-directs her 27 month-old child after he angrily grabs a toy from his playmate. The darkened arrow represents the structure of boy's primary goal-directed activity. The dashed arrow on the right depicts the mother's disciplinary strategy. In this context, the mother's intervention fosters the development of self-awareness and self-control by *directing her child's conscious attention back upon his own action and experience*. This process of externally regulated self-reflection is represented by the reflective looping back of a child's primary action onto his or her own ongoing activity and experience.

Insert Figure 1 about here.

This notion of self-awareness directly implies a distinction between *agency* and *identity*, *subject* and *object*, "*I*" and "*me*". We generally experience conscious activity as a process through which we exert control over action (James, 1890). In this way, we experience a sense of *agency*, *subjectivity* or "*I*" in our primary activity (Blasi & Glodis 1995). When primary action

loops back upon itself, it constructs a representation of itself as an *object* of awareness (James, 1890; Mascolo, 2004; Mead, 1934). This reflective construction of the self as an object of awareness sets the stage for the social creation of self and identity. In the example provided in Figure 1, the mother's words function to *organize* and *regulate* her child's awareness of "I" and "me" in socially meaningful ways. For example, the child is aware that his mother wants him to "stop hitting" and "be a gentleman". The development of the awareness that "I'm not being a *gentleman*" reflects the child's other-regulated construction of self-as-object. The other-regulated construction of the child's awareness that "*I can stop hitting*" organizes the child's sense of personal agency ("*I*").

What is the function of this constructed sense of self? Why is it important? The birth of the self brings with it the capacity of self-regulation and self-control. When a child constructs a sense of *who she is* and *what she can do*, she can use this constructed sense to regulate her actions, thoughts and feelings within social contexts (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Mascolo, Fischer & Neimeyer, 1999). In this way, representations of self function as higher-order control structures that regulate action in social exchanges. In Figure 1, the mother's intervention directs an act of constructive reflection by her child. Over time, the child can use his jointly created representations of self to regulate his action and experience with others. This includes identifying and regulating his feelings of anger; acting in accordance with his image of "gentleman"; developing a sense of being able to interact with others, etc. In this way, the development of self-awareness operates as a control system that drives social action.

### **Self-Evaluative Moral Emotions and the Development of Self**

In recent decades, researchers have proposed that emotion plays a central role in the organization of consciousness, action and development (Fischer, Shaver & Carnochan, 1990; Freeman, 2002; Mascolo, Fischer & Li, 2002; Tomkins, 1987). From this view, self-evaluative and moral emotions take on special significance. If the self functions as a moral guide in social action, it follows that socio-moral emotions must play a central role in the development of moral

selves. Such emotions undergo profound changes throughout the toddler years (Barrett, 1998; Mascolo & Fischer, 1995; Schore, 1994). Analysis of changes in these emotions provides a window to the development of self over the toddler years.

As indicated in Figure 1, emotional experiences are composed of at least three coacting classes of component processes (Mascolo, Fischer, & Li, 2002). These include a motive-relevant *appraisal*, a characteristic affect or *feeling tone* and a *motive-action tendency* (Frijda, 1986). Appraisal processes refer to ongoing assessments of the relation between perceived events and a person's goals, motives, and concerns (Lazarus, 1991). In any given context, ongoing motive-event appraisals continuously modulate the emotional *feeling tone*. In addition, any given form of emotional experience is organized with reference to particular classes of *motive-action tendencies*. An action tendency refers to emotion-typical actions that function to bring about changes in events that are consistent with one's goals, motives and concerns. Action tendencies embody voluntary (i.e., instrumental actions) as well as involuntary motor-action systems (e.g., facial, postural, vocal changes).

Table 1 provides a description of the anatomy of anger, guilt and shame as they are experienced among adults in North American and Western European cultures. (The situation is different for adults in China, and presumably some other cultures; Mascolo et al., 2002; Li, Wang, & Fischer, 2004.) Among adults, anger functions as a moral emotion. Anger involves appraisals that events are not only *unwanted* but also contrary to the way they *ought* to be (de Rivera, 1981; Mascolo & Griffin, 1998; Roseman, Spindel & Jose, 1991). We call such morally-tinged appraisals *ought violations*. In anger, this implies an attribution of blame to others (Lazarus, 1991). In describing the affective or feeling component of anger, individuals use metaphors such as "heat", "pressure" and "tension" (Davitz, 1969). De Rivera (1981) has suggested that the affective component of anger involves the experience of the *strengthening of will* to move against the other. The action tendencies involved in anger consist of actions directed toward *removing ought violations* (Mascolo & Griffin, 1998). Action tendencies include

instrumental (e.g., verbal or physical attack; indirect or passive aggression; retribution; retaliation, etc.) as well as *facial* (e.g., furrowed brow; square mouth), *vocal* (e.g., increased volume, pace) and *bodily* (e.g., flailing arms) acts.

Insert Table 1 about here.

Guilt and shame not only have strong socio-moral dimensions; they are also self-evaluative emotions. The experiences of guilt and shame are mediated by appraisals that one has departed from social standards for evaluating the self. At the same time, the experiences of guilt and shame *motivate* acts of self-reflection and self-evaluation. As indicated in Table 1, experiences of guilt are mediated by appraisals that the self is responsible for a wrongdoing (Hoffman, 2000; Mascolo & Fischer, 1995; Zahn-Waxler, 1990). The experience of guilt is often described as “heavy”, as if a person were “weighed down”. Many people describe the experience as a “sinking” or “tugging” in the chest or torso (Davitz, 1969). In guilt, persons are motivated to correct the perceived wrongdoing (Baumeister, 1994; Hoffman, 2000; Lindsay-Hartz, de Rivera & Mascolo, 1995). Note that it is not always necessary for an individual to have committed an actual wrongdoing to feel guilt; it is merely necessary for individuals to *assume responsibility* for wrongful conditions. Examples of such experiences include the sense of survivor guilt, as well as feelings of guilt experienced by people (e.g., Mother Theresa) who assume responsibility for the plight of others (de Rivera, 1994).

Although they are strongly related, guilt and shame differ in fundamental ways in Western culture (Lindsay-Hartz, deRivera and Mascolo, 1995; Tangney, Miller, Flicker & Barlow, 1996). In guilt, a person’s experience and action is focused upon a wrongful act or condition; in shame, the focus is on a flaw in the self in the eyes of others (H. B. Lewis, 1971; M. Lewis, 1993; Scheff, 2000, 2003; Tangney & Dearing, 2003). In shame, one’s entire identity or self is experienced as devalued in the eyes of others. This is embodied in Lindsay-Hartz’ description of the “psychological situation” of shame: “upon viewing ourselves *through the eyes of another*, we realize that we are in fact who we do not want to be and that we cannot now be otherwise”

(Lindsay-Hartz, de Rivera & Mascolo, 1995, p. 278, emphasis in original). Shame is embodied by a sense of being “small” or “exposed”. In shame, people experience the desire to hide the face or hide the self. Thus, in guilt we focus on a wrongful act; in shame we reflect upon a person’s social identity in the eyes of self and other.

Scheff (2000, 2003) argues convincingly that shame operates as a quintessential *social* emotion. He differentiates among at least two meanings of shame. According to Scheff, these two senses are discriminated non-English European languages. The first consists of the notion of shame as disgrace (*disgrace shame*; e.g., *schande* in German). The second refers to the more ubiquitous sense of everyday shame (*scham*). This more general conception of shame superordinates a family of emotions related to the social devaluation of self, including shame, embarrassment, shyness, humiliation, etc. According to Scheff (2000), such everyday shame can arise from virtually any threat to a social bond. Because of its ubiquity, everyday shame functions as a “master emotion of everyday life”; it plays a central role in the regulation of social relations. In Chinese this master emotion has been extensively elaborated, with a large vocabulary of shame words differentiated into six large families and more than a dozen subfamilies of shame.

Because of a taboo placed on acknowledging shame in North American and Western European culture, people feel a strong need to hide their shame. As a result, much shame goes unacknowledged. For Scheff, such unacknowledged shame gives rise to feelings of anger and humiliated fury. One might suggest that these latter emotions function as ways to protect the self from social experience of shame. Evidence supports the proposition that shame can evoke anger not only in moment-by-moment social interaction (Lewis, 1971; Retzinger, 1993; Scheff & Retzinger, 1993) but also in studies that assess broad dispositions toward shame and anger (Tangney, Wagner, Hill-Barlow, Marschall & Gramzow, 1996; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher & Gramzow, 1992). In Chinese, with its elaborated vocabulary for shame, there is a substantial family of words for shame turning into anger (Li, Wang, & Fischer, 2004).

In toddlerhood, it is likely that guilt, shame and anger develop through overlapping processes. Guilt, shame and anger develop as children internalize socio-moral standards and use them to represent, evaluate and regulate the self in social interaction. Further, as socio-moral emotions, anger, guilt and shame are related in complex ways. Shame and guilt are structurally similar and are often experienced in similar contexts. Shame plays an important role in the evocation of anger and aggression in social interaction, and in some cultures such as China it plays a major role in socialization (Mascolo et al., 2002). Further, parental demands that children regulate their anger and conform to social rules figure in the development of guilt and shame as well. In what follows, we chart developmental transformations in multiple components of anger, guilt and shame over the toddler years for children in American culture. In so doing, we examine social processes by which these experiences are formed as well as the ways in which they both organize and are organized by changes in the capacity to represent and regulate the self.

### **TRAJECTORIES OF SOCIO-MORAL AND SELF-EVALUATIVE EMOTION**

Socio-moral and self-evaluative emotions move through systematic developmental transformations in appraisal, action and self-regulation. What changes in development is the particular *emergent structure* of an action and meaning as it is deployed within a particular context. We use Fischer's (1980) model of skill development to characterize these developmental trajectories, because it has been used successfully to predict emotional development in diverse domains. It specifies a series of 13 levels organized in four tiers in the development of particular skills from infancy through adulthood. For example, appraisal, action and regulatory components of anger develop through the four broad tiers -- *reflexes*, *sensori-motor actions*, *representations* and *abstractions*. *Reflexes* (emerging near birth) consist of innate action elements (e.g., distress-related facial actions to painful stimuli). *Sensori-motor actions* (emerging around 4-months of age) consist of the proactive execution of actions directed toward persons or objects in one's immediate environs (e.g., pushing away an

obstacle to a goal-directed action). *Representations* (emerging around 18-24 months of age) consist of symbolic meanings that symbolize concrete aspects of persons, objects or internal states (e.g., “that dolly is mine!”). *Abstractions* (emerging around 10-11 years of age) consist of generalized meaning structures that represent intangible, abstract or general aspects of persons, events, or experiences (e.g., “You don’t care about me the way a father should “).

Within each of these broad tiers, appraisal, action and regulatory skills develop through four levels: *Single sets*, *mappings*, *systems* and *systems of systems*. Higher level skill structures emerge from the successive differentiation and inter-coordination of lower-level skills or skill components. Below, drawing upon existing research, we use Fischer’s (1980) neo-Piagetian framework to trace developmental changes in appraisal, action and regulatory components through these various levels and tiers of development. Figure 2 outlines strands in a developmental web describing structural changes in the development of guilt, anger and shame. In what follows, we outline developmental changes in these emotions and their relations through the toddler years.

Insert Figure 2 About Here.

### **The Development of Anger**

Emerging around two-months of age, anger develops gradually in a series of steps throughout the first year of life (Mascolo, Mancuso & Dukewich, in press; Sroufe, 1996). For our purposes, we begin our analysis of the development of anger just prior to the onset of the toddler years. As depicted in Step A1 in Figure 2, beginning around 7-8 months of age, an infant is capable of constructing *sensori-motor mappings*, coordinating the relation between two single sensori-motor acts (e.g., *removing* a cover in order to *retrieve* a hidden object). This level of skill underlies an infant’s protest when a wanted adult leaves a child’s field of vision. The parent’s act of leaving her child’s field of vision acts as a form of *cued-recall*. Her leaving cues the wish to get her back, which creates a goal-violation. The resulting anger state

energizes the sensori-motor action of actively seeking the absent parent in order to re-establish contact.

Beginning around 12-13 months of age, toddlers gain the capacity to coordinate two or more sensori-motor mappings into a single sensori-motor system. At the level of sensori-motor systems, a child can deploy combinations of multiple sensori-motor actions to actively explore his or her physical and social world. Children's assurgent explorations inevitably begin to trespass parental boundaries. Soon after the onset of sensori-motor systems, toddlers begin to exhibit temper tantrums (Potegal, Kosorok & Davidson, 1996). Tantrums often occur when an adult rejects a child's demand, especially in contexts involving the depletion of a toddler's physical or emotional resources (e.g., fatigue, hunger). Tantrums arise around this time as a product of a series of converging developmental conditions. First, at this level, in contexts that support their creation, toddlers can begin to construct more stable mental goals for wanted objects. While younger children are often able to be distracted from the wanted object, at the more advanced level of sensori-motor systems, a toddler can sometimes keep in mind the goal of the wanted object despite attempts to divert his or her attention. However, the pre-representational capacities for delay of gratification and self-control remain limited., and children have not yet developed the capacity to control the emotional reactions that arise from unmet demands. In addition, they have not encountered the requisite social experiences needed to develop skills for delaying gratification. For these reasons also, the result is the temper tantrum.

How adults respond to a child's negative affect in contexts that involve tantrums is crucial in the development of anger-regulation strategies. Parental discipline in such contexts is important for promoting rule internalization and the development of effective social skills. In North American and Western European societies, anger regulation is fostered by parenting styles that involve emotionally responsive but firm control of the enactment of anger. In the context of a tantrum, this style involves providing both firm enforcement of the prohibition in question -- not "giving in" to a child -- while also providing a physically and emotionally safe

environment for the child throughout the course of the tantrum. After the tantrum, the parent is able to use inductive explanation (Hoffman, 1970; 2000; Mancuso & Handin, 1985) and provide alternative strategies for handling refusals in the future. Such practices enable children not only to develop strategies for bringing anger under control, but they also teach children that their anger enactments will not be successful.

Both punitive and permissive tantrum regulation strategies can put children at risk for emotional dysregulation. Given an angry episode, the parent may put forth efforts to terminate the outburst. Many parents find children's anger noxious. One way to terminate a child's unpleasant angry display is to yield to the child's demands. Such practices foster what Patterson (Patterson, Reid, & Dishion 1992) calls the *coercions cycle*. A child uses anger to advance his agenda; the parent gives in to the child's overture to eliminate the noxious display. The parent's yielding socially reinforces the child's anger, and the cycle escalates. Alternatively, parents may react to children's anger with hostile and punitive discipline. In some families, this may involve physical or hostile aggression. Research has consistently demonstrated that such forms of punishment do not forestall aggression in the long run but rather promote it (Watson, Fischer, & Andreas, 2004). Such extreme practices not only fail to promote the development of effective emotional regulation, they have the effect of perpetuating the use of aggression as a strategy for social problem solving.

Beginning around 18-24 months of age, children enter the *representational* tier of development. Representations consist of concrete symbolic meanings. The use of representations allows children to go beyond the here-and-now of sensori-motor experience and cued recall. Recall that with development, beliefs about what ought to happen play an increasing role: Experiences of anger become increasingly mediated by appraisals that events violate what a child believes *ought* to exist. As a socio-moral concept, an *ought* requires the capacity to compare what currently exists to some *preferred* or *idealized way* an event *should* be. In this way, the representation of oughts in appraisal activity requires the mediation of

signs and symbols, which children develop the capacity to construct generally and effectively in the representational tier of development.

At 18-24 months of age, children build many single representations by coordinating two or more skills at the sensori-motor system level. Using *single representations*, children can begin to construct single morally tinged social categories for representing self, others, social relations, and one's own desires. This includes the symbolic construct of a sense of *agency (I)*, *identity (me)*, and *possession (mine)* (Mascolo & Fischer, 1998). As indicated in Step A3 in Figure 2, the first genuine *ought violations* emerge as intrusions on a child's symbolic boundaries or concrete sense of agency or ownership. For example, at this level, a child can appraise a peer's actions as violating his or her concrete sense of *mine*. In anger, a child can construct an *appraisal* like "You took my doll!" At this level, although many children continue to exhibit various forms of physical aggression, verbal attacks (e.g., "I don't like you!") can begin to replace physical aggression in anger. In addition, using single representations, children can exhibit verbal protests accompanied by morally-relevant justifications (e.g., "that's mine!"). At this age, anger regulation is often unstable; children can assuage strong emotion by looking away. They can often inhibit angry aggression in the presence of adults, but they are notably inconsistent.

The third year of life is an important time for socio-moral development and the further development of emotional regulation. The capacity to form signs and symbols allows children to represent increasingly sophisticated socio-moral-affective meanings – conceptions of the way the world *should* be, including their own wishes and goals. Over time, children appropriate and identify with such meanings. As a result, the appraisals involved in anger states as well as other emotions become increasingly mediated by socio-moral standards. In addition, children use such socio-moral standards to regulate and control their enactments of anger. The construction of socio-moral meaning arises in everyday sign-mediated activity with socialization agents. Such meanings are constructed in everyday encounters with socialization agents.

This everyday process is represented in the mother-child interaction displayed in Figure 1. In this situation, a mother responds to her child's angry display with an inductive child-management strategy (Hoffman, 1983). The adult's disciplinary action serves multiple functions. It prompts her child to perform a *controlled act of inhibition* ("stop that right now!") and articulates the concrete *socio-moral rule* that was violated ("...never hit!") and links that moral rule to the parent's desired image of the child's self (i.e., "gentleman"). It also directs the child's attention to the *internal state* of the hurt child ("how would you feel if...?"). Within the same exchange, the parent acknowledges the transgressor's emotional state ("I know you want the doll...") while simultaneously providing directives that function to build social skills ("but you have to ask nicely"). These everyday interventions foster the development of moral meanings that come to mediate the regulation and experience of self and anger.

Over time, such external regulation prompts transformation in and regulation of each component of a child's emotional processes. Firm limits from parents instruct a child of the unacceptability of the anger display and place demands on him or her to develop strategies for regulating affect and action. Rule inductions stated by parents foster changes in the socio-moral appraisals that mediate experiences of anger. Strategy instruction and modeling provide the child with alternative strategies for negotiating social interaction. Strategy induction described by parents not only increases the likelihood that successful social relations will prevent future angry encounters; it also promotes the development of conflict management and anger-regulation strategies. Acknowledgement of emotional reactions functions to maintain the affectively positive parent-child relationship within and beyond the context of a discipline encounter.

As a result of these social processes, throughout the third year of life, children become increasingly capable of exerting control over their experiences and enactments of anger. In addition, as children define themselves and their desires with reference to increasingly internalized socio-moral meanings (however concrete), the appraisals that mediate their

experiences of anger become more complex. For example, by 30 to 36 months of age, many children in North American and Western European cultures begin to internalize a sense of the socio-moral value placed on being a “big boy” or a “big girl”. As a result, around this age, many children begin to resist being characterized as a “baby”. The emotional shift is dramatic and abrupt (Pipp, Fischer, & Jennings, 1987). As depicted in Step A4 in Figure 2, children can begin to experience a sense of being “insulted” as they internalize and define the self in terms of single socio-moral categories. At this level, a child who is called a “baby” by a peer or an adult is capable of verbally protesting the insult by asserting the opposite (e.g., “I’m not a baby!”) or retaliating (e.g., “You are the baby!”). While instances of physical aggression remain common, children are increasingly able to limit and control aggressive impulses.

The mediation of anger by judgments that others have *insulted* the self highlights the relationship between the development of *anger* and *shame*. In her analysis of psychotherapy exchanges among adults, Lewis (1987) reported that verbal and non-verbal markers of anger were almost always preceded by markers of shame. Scheff (2001, 2002; Scheff & Retzinger, 1991) suggests that among adults, because of strong taboos against shame, unacknowledged or hidden shame gives rise to anger and rage, perhaps even as a strategy for hiding shame. Even in China, where there is no taboo on shame, the link between shame and anger is clear in the many words describing that link (Li et al., 2004). Toddlers have not yet developed the self-regulation strategies to hide their shame. We suggest that among most toddlers in North America, shame-relevant events (e.g., insults) lead directly to anger. We suggest that the ways in which adults respond to a child’s shame are important in the development of the shame → anger cycle. This point is discussed further below.

Step A5 emerges at around 3 ½ to 4 years of age with the capacity to coordinate two single representations into a *representational mapping*. With this capacity, a child can understand different types of relations between two or more representations (e.g., cause and effect; sequential order; reciprocity, etc.). Using representational mappings, children can begin

to construct motives based on social comparisons. For example, 4 ½ year-old Jack had developed a consistent desire to be the “first one” to go in or out of a door. This motive requires a capacity to *order* the actions of self and other. One day, an older girl raced Jack to the door. With an angry face and voice (*action*), Jack said “I want to be first” (motive-relevant *appraisal*) and forced himself in front of the girl (*action tendency*). In anger, the boy symbolically “hit” the girl by making a hitting gesture and pulling it just prior to contact. This act shows a continued capacity to *regulate* angry actions in a creative way. It will take several more years before children consolidate their social comparison skills to focus consistently on social comparisons in their interactions and motivations.

### **The Development of Shame**

Shame and guilt are self-evaluative emotions, as we have emphasized; they require the dual capacity for self-awareness and the evaluation of self with social standards. Because self-awareness undergoes profound changes in the second year of life (Pipp, Fischer & Jennings, 1987; Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1978; Mascolo & Fischer, 1998), it is not surprising that the toddler years are important ones for the development of shame, guilt and other self-evaluative emotions. Figure 2 contains representations of developmental changes in the structure of shame experiences over the toddler years.

A variety of emotion theorists (Schore, 1994; Tomkins, 1987) have suggested that shame emerges in the first quarter of the second year of life. Schore (1994) has suggested that shame has its origins in socio-affective interaction between adults and toddlers. Drawing upon the work of Tomkins (1963), Schore (1994) suggests that shame functions as an inhibitor of positive and assurgent affect. Tomkins (1963) and Izard (1991) indicate that emotional experiences of interest-excitement and joy reflect states of heightened arousal. Shame occurs in interpersonal contexts in which an adult’s negatively charged gaze inhibits a child’s assurgent action, interest and enjoyment. Over the first year of life, infants develop expectations that their adult companions will respond with contingent positive affect to their overtures. In the second

year of life, with increases in exploratory behavior, children necessarily perform acts that bring about parental displeasure and even disgust (Lewis, 1992). When this occurs, adult facial and vocal behavior function to inhibit a child's positive affect. The resulting shame for the child produces a precipitous decline in affective arousal, accompanied by negative feeling tone. In such contexts, infants avert their gaze from the disapproving adult. This is a precursor or early form of shame.

As with other emotions, shame develops gradually and takes on a series of different forms over time and in different interpersonal contexts. Shame-like behavior has its early emergence in the first quarter of the second year of life. At Step S1, with the onset of sensori-motor systems, a child is capable of experiencing shame-like *intersubjective misattunement* (Schore, 1994), as we have described. Figure 2 depicts a situation in which a toddler breaks a toy and is met with disapproving facial and vocal behavior on the part of a parent. At this level, the child is able to coordinate two sensori-motor mappings into a single sensori-motor system. Using the first mapping, the toddler is able to see a change in the toy from its initially intact state to a broken state (i.e., intact -- broken). Using a second sensori-motor mapping, in the context of direct parental disapproval, the child is able to link the parent's disapproving affect to his own actions on the toy (e.g., unexpected adult affect -- I act on toy). A shame-like state (e.g. gaze aversion) arises from the clash between the child's desired expectation of positive affect on the part of the adult and the sensori-motor experience of the parent's disapproving affect toward the child.

Although Schore (1994) and others (e.g., Tomkins, 1963) refer to such early emotional states as *shame*, we prefer to think of these reactions as precursors to shame. In shame, individuals are aware of the exposure of their flawed self in the eyes of others (Lindsay-Hartz, de Rivera & Mascolo, 1995). This is a complex self-evaluative and social appraisal. It not only requires the capacity for self-awareness but also the capacity to use socio-moral standards -- however concrete and contextualized -- to evaluate the self in the eyes of others. As such, we

prefer to view early social distress in the context of a disapproving adult as but one early step in the continuous development of shame.

An important transformation in shame-like experiences occurs with the onset of single symbolic representations around 18-24 months of age. At this level, a toddler is capable of constructing single, concrete social categories, such as representing concrete aspects of his or her own sense of agency (i.e., “I”), identity (e.g., “me”), or ownership (e.g., “mine”). A toddler’s sense of shame can be mediated by symbolic representations of how the self is seen in the eyes of others. However, at this early level of development, a child’s representational capacities are still quite limited. An adult’s affectively charged evaluative feedback provides a type of emotional scaffolding that helps to “put together” a symbolic sense of social devaluation in the toddler’s experience. Among adults, shame can be experienced in terms of the differentiated and articulated sense that “I am a horrible person and everyone knows it”. At this early level, a toddler’s capacity to represent self through the eyes of others is rudimentary, concrete and global. In the context of direct adult disapproval, a child can construct a concrete affect-laden awareness that “*mommy sees me* –” or “*mommy sees me bad*”, as depicted in Step S2 in Figure 2.

Although shame and guilt have common elements, it is important to note the ways in which shame and guilt differ. In shame, the toddler has constructed an awareness of a flawed (bad) *self* in the eyes of the adult; in guilt, a toddler is aware of having *acted* in a way that hurts others or brings about adult disapproval. At this level, shame involves the self-conscious awareness of another’s disapproving gaze; guilt involves the awareness that one’s actions have caused disapproval or distress. It is tantamount to the difference between “mommy sees my badness” and “I did a bad thing”.

Research on development of the experience of shame remains limited. A variety of studies have indicated that shame-like behavior emerges around 18-24 months of age, if not earlier, and continues to develop over the third year of life. A common paradigm in the study of

shame employs the broken-toy scenario (Barrett, Zahn-Waxler, & Cole, 1993; Kochanska, 2002). In this situation, an adult allows a child a valued toy that has been rigged to break upon casual use. The child's emotional reaction is observed upon breaking the toy and as adults question the child in a neutral fashion about the toy. Using this procedure, Barrett, Zahn-Waxler and Cole (1993) found that toddlers between the ages of 25 and 36 months could be reliably distinguished into a shame-relevant and guilt-relevant group. The shame-relevant group – the avoiders -- tended to avoid the adult after the mishap. They were also slow to attempt to fix the toy or admit the mishap. Toddlers in the guilt-relevant group – the amenders – were quick to admit and make reparations for the mishap.

Over the third year of life, toddlers' concrete self representations become organized with reference to increasingly internalized socio-moral content. By 36 months of age, many such concrete socio-moral meanings have been fully internalized. At Step S3, a child can create more stable evaluations of self as viewed from the eyes of others. As a result, upon violating a rule, children can begin to *anticipate* an adult's opprobrium and begin to feel a more internalized sense of shame. At this level, a child's sense of shame can be mediated by concrete social categories. For example, given appropriate contextual support, a child can construct a motive-relevant representation such as "Mommy sees me a *baby*" or "Mommy thinks I'm *icky*". At this level, children's action tendencies in shame become both more deliberate and subtle. Children may run to another room and hide or verbally attempt to deflect attention from the self (e.g., "Don't see me!"). When confronted, a child may divert her gaze; when queried, a child remains silent, mumbles or speaks in a halting or muted way. As indicated above, at this level, as a child is able to represent the specific content of his or her socially or morally devalued self, a child can experience shame in the form of a rudimentary insult. As such, shame can motivate angry defiance or protest. Regulation of shame at this step is still quite limited. Actions exhibited in shame – both attempts to withdraw and hide the self as well as attempts to move against others in anger – function to defend the self against social scrutiny.

Beginning around 3 ½ to 4 years of age, with the onset of the capacity to construct representational mappings, children can hold in mind relations between two representations. At this point, given contextual support, a child can compare the self and other on a variety of simple dimensions. At Step S4, in the context of disapproving feedback, a child can construct a sense of comparative shame. For example, a child can construct a relational sense of shame in the context of receiving critical feedback such as a “What a tattler! Why can’t you be more like your sister? She never tattles on you!” or “Don’t be a sissy – that boy over there can climb the bars!” Because these are emerging skills, children act inconsistently, sometimes using these shame skills and sometimes not.

Further, having constructed internalized standards for representing the self in the eyes of others, a child can begin to represent more clearly the relation between his or her actions and their effects on others. For example, after a period of feeling proud of his capacity to use the bathroom successfully, one 4 ½ year-old boy, after having a bowel movement in the presence of his mother, said without provocation “What’s that smell? No! Don’t look at me!” Although this particular mother and child would often engage in mutually enjoyable games that centered on the theme of bad smells (e.g., “stinky feet”, etc.), the mother reported that she was “open” and worked not to make her child feel ashamed of such matters. Still the negative valence of messing in his pants led to his shame reaction even in the absence of explicit shaming. Children play an active role in constructing their standards of self-evaluation.

### **The Development of Guilt**

Although they are often experienced in similar social circumstances, guilt and shame are different experiences that serve different psychological and social functions (Barrett, 1998; Tangney, 2002; Lindsay-Hartz, de Rivera & Mascolo, 1995). There are at least two salient occasions for the development of guilt in development: transgressions of social rules – violating the do’s and don’ts of development (e.g., Kochanska, 1991; Emde & Buchsbaum, 1980), and taking responsibility for causing harm in others (Baumeister, Stillwell & Heatherton, 1994;

Hoffman, 1998, 2000; Zahn-Waxler, 1991). Figure 2 describes developmental changes in the structure of guilt-like states over the toddler years. At Step G1, children in the first quarter of the second year of life exhibit (a) empathic concern for distress in others and (b) guilt-like reactions upon parental prohibition of action. (A skill at an earlier age relevant to guilt is the step shown for anger during the first year of life.) Zahn-Waxler and her colleagues (Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, Wagner & Chapman, 1992; Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow & King, 1979) have shown convincingly that as young as the first quarter of the second year of life, infants show considerable empathic and sympathetic concern for the pain of others. At this level, children often have difficulty discriminating the source of another person's distress; many toddlers tend to show concern whether or not they have been the source of another person's pain. As indicated in Figure 2, children express their concern by showing signs of empathic or sympathetic distress for the other person's emotional state, and/or attempting to comfort or help the person in distress. Such empathic and guilt-relevant action tendencies occur in both disciplinary encounters as well as in situations in which others experience pain.

It is important to stress the role of social context in producing empathic and guilt-like actions at this early level. Toddlers generally evince such reactions in richly affective social situations in which another person's pain or displeasure is abundantly evident. In this way, the other person's affective state helps to structure a child's empathic and guilt-like actions. Zahn-Waxler (1990) provided a series of representative descriptions of such empathic states in emerging toddlers. For example,

Child is pounding with cup and accidentally hits father hard in the nose. (Father gives loud "ouch."). Child drops cup, looks very serious, leans forward to father for a kiss (61 weeks; p. 247).

Child repeatedly turns milk cup upside down. (Mother starts to hit child's hand but then takes the cup away and calls her a bad girl.) Child whines and calls herself "bad" (69 weeks; p. 247)

Child bangs head against mother's face in excess of affection. (Mother restrains, verbally prohibits and explains, "that hurts.") child says "kiss, kiss" and kisses mother. Then bangs head on mother again and says, "hurting, hurting." (Mother acknowledges and verbally prohibits) (75 weeks; p. 248)

In these interactions, the children described evoke genuine emotional concern and reparative action in contexts of direct affective feedback and/or regulation on the part of a parent. The structure of such early empathic and guilt-like reactions is depicted in Step G1 in Figure 2. Although there appears to be a vague awareness on the part of the parent of her child's role in producing negative affect, the child's awareness is highly and largely undifferentiated from her empathic concern for the other.

Step G2 emerges between 18-24 months of age with the capacity to form single symbolic representations. At this level, children begin to construct symbolic representations of their own agency in producing outcomes. As a result, children can begin to attribute causality to themselves for actions that cause distress in others or that bring about negatively charged reactions from others. This is an important step in the development of guilt experiences. In contexts in which children break parental rules or cause pain in others, a child can make an appraisal such as "I hurt your toe" or "I write on wall". In such contexts, as indicated in Figure 1, authoritative parents of North American and Western European children often use inductive discipline techniques to explain the nature of the violated rule, draw children's attention to the effects of their actions on others, and apologize to the offended party and make reparative actions (Hoffman, 2000). Although children increasingly internalize these prescriptions over the second and third years of life, their guilt-like reparative behavior is also motivated by their evolving sense of concern for the other. This involves both empathic concern and a continuing desire to please adults in their world. Zahn-Waxler (1990) provides descriptions of several such emotional reactions in children in the second year of life:

Child writes on sofa with indelible pen. Mother and father express horror (“How could you? etc.) but do not yell. Child bursts into tears, starts screaming “I want Mommy,” then throws arms around mother. He starts wiping at sofa with hands and says “I clean up pencil” (93 weeks; p. 248).

Child throws tantrum. (Mother spansks her and sends her to her room.) Sibling tells child to “go give Mommy a kiss and tell her you’re sorry. Child goes into room and says “sorry,” then tries to cuddle with mother, sobbing profusely (101 weeks; p. 249)).

Child pulls cousin’s hair (Mother tells her not to.) Child crawls to cousin and says, “I hurt our hair; please don’t cry,” then gives her a kiss (104 weeks; p. 249).

The structure of such guilt-like interactions is depicted in Step G2 in Figure 2. In each of these states, the child is explicitly aware of his or her role in precipitating negative affect in another person (child or parent). In richly affective social interactions that often (but not always) involve direct parental intervention, the child expresses remorse, apologizes or attempts to make reparations. At this age, children may use a variety of rudimentary strategies to regulate their guilt-like feelings, including looking away, emotional affiliation with adult, or self-soothing.

As children construct and internalize socio-moral meanings over the third year of life, they become increasingly capable of experiencing guilt feelings outside of the context of direct intervention by parents. Children’s guilt experiences are increasingly mediated by appraisals involving attributions of responsibility to the self for performing acts defined with reference to specific socio-moral content. In addition, although adult intervention is often needed to motivate pro-social activity, children become increasingly likely to apologize, make reparations, confess misdeeds without direct intervention by adults. In some circumstances, children are able to experience guilt in circumstances that are removed from the initial transgression. Zahn-Waxler (1990) describes such a case of in a precocious two-year-old:

Child hurts friend at nursery school. (Teacher asks her if she can do something to make the friend feel better, and she brings other child toy.) The next day she points to her

mother's eyes and says, "Tears, Mary had tears, I pushed Mary off chair, I sorry". Child wanted mother to take her to school that afternoon to say she was sorry (107 weeks). (Also, at 102 weeks, child verbalized regret; "Hurt—sorry—sorry Grandpa; hurt him," over having hurt her grandfather two weeks earlier (p. 249).

The structure of such experiences is depicted in Step G3 in Figure 2. The description provided above illustrates the case of a child whose assumption of explicit responsibility for the distress of another person is deferred in time; this suggests a degree of internalization of the capacity to experience guilt. Most likely, however, most experiences of guilt at this early age are evoked and supported by contextual cues (e.g., the sight of the mother's eyes in the example provided above). While we believe it is appropriate to begin to refer to such internalized experiences as interpersonal guilt, it is important to differentiate these early states as different from more ruminative experiences of guilt that are capable of structuring reparative action over longer periods of time later in childhood and in adulthood.

As children move beyond toddlerhood, they gain the capacity to construct more differentiated forms of guilt. Experiences of guilt are mediated by judgments that make reference to blameworthy actions in the self and the effect of those actions on others. With the onset of representational mappings around 3 ½ to 4 years of age, guilt experiences can become increasingly mediated by appraisals that explicitly embrace relations between concrete aspects of the self's actions and their effects on the internal states of others. The structure of such differentiated experiences of guilt is depicted in Step G4 in Figure 2. For example, in social contexts that support their construction, a child is capable of making an appraisal such as "I took Mark's toy and now he is sad" or "I was mean to Sally and now she doesn't like me." Such other-oriented appraisals support the production of more complex guilt-relevant action tendencies. With the capacity to hold in mind both the self's misdeed and the other's internal state, children's attempts at reparations become less egocentric; although still quite limited, children are increasingly able to organize their reparations with reference to the internal state of

the offended other. A child can link his apology directly to the victim's hurt feelings (e.g., "Don't be sad. I'm sorry I took your doll."). In addition, children's emerging powers to represent concrete relations between self and other bring forth new ways to regulate feelings of guilt. For example, in social interaction, children can begin to defend against their guilt feelings using social strategies such as prevarication (e.g., "I didn't take her doll!"), and mitigation (e.g., "I didn't do it on purpose!"), and justification (e.g., "He hit me first!"). At this level, such strategies arise between individuals in social interaction, and because they are emerging skills, they are often not used consistently until a few years later. In general, the regulation of guilt experiences undergoes transformation in later childhood and even adulthood as individuals develop the capacity to direct such defensive strategies toward themselves within internal dialogue rather than using them to defray guilt in interactions with other persons.

### **The Role of Socio-Moral Emotion in the Development of Self**

The developmental progressions for self-evaluative and socio-moral emotions during the toddler years provide foundations for further development in self and social relations. Figure 3 describes a model for converging and diverging pathways in the development of self and socio-emotional behavior that arise as a product of different patterns of child temperament and adult socialization. The model describes pathways toward three different developmental outcomes among North American and Western-European populations. Each pathway is defined with reference to relations between a child's temperamental dispositions and social experience.

*Normative* pathways (Pathways A, B and C) result in the development of self-regulated moral selves and interactions. Such modes of functioning are mediated by internalization of social rules, feelings of empathy, and experiences of "shame-free" guilt upon committing acts of wrongdoing toward others. The model identifies six pathways toward the development of three types socio-emotional moral selves. Pathway A (positive/normative) involves children who exhibit temperamental styles characterized by positive affect, capacity for high levels of attentional focus and self-control, and/or a heightened capacity for empathy (Rothbart & Ahadi,

1994; Zahn-Waxler, 1990). Such children can readily profit from parents' use of inductive child-management strategies to regulate the children's behavior. Rule internalization is facilitated by children's empathic dispositions and capacity to regulate behavior in terms of parental standards. Pathway B (negative/normative) involves children with dispositions toward negative affect (i.e., irritability, frustration, etc.) and high capacity for self-regulation and attentional focus. Although such children enter social interactions with a disposition toward anger and aggression, in light of their capacity for self-regulation, such children can learn to regulate angry dispositions if they are provided with consistently firm but non-hostile parental discipline. Pathway C (inhibited/normative) is organized with reference to children who exhibit "fearful", "inhibited" or "self-conscious" affective biases. Many theorists have suggested that such affective dispositions predispose children to attend to and internalize parental rules and prohibitions. However, for such children, gentle discipline that functions to modulate fear reactions to subjectively tolerable levels is necessary to promote rule internalization.

Insert Figure 3 about here.

The model also specifies three non-normative developmental pathways. Pathway D (negative/externalizing) involves movement toward the *shame-anger cycle* (Scheff, 1987; Tangney). Children who are temperamentally disposed to *negative affect* and *poor self-regulation* are at risk for taking this development pathway. In light of their relative inability to control aggressive behavior, such children are more likely to engender extreme discipline strategies. Some adults are likely to respond to their children's aggression with hostile discipline. Such child-management strategies have the dual effects of precipitating shameful affect as well as aggressive reactions to shame experiences (the *shame-anger cycle*). Other parents respond by "giving in" to their child's aggressive behavior, perpetuating what Patterson calls the coercion cycle. In this cycle, a parent's "giving in" provides social reinforcement that perpetuates a child's aggression.

Pathway E (inhibited/internalizing) involves movement toward self-conscious and internalizing social interactions. We suggest that children who are temperamentally biased toward “fearful/inhibited” or “anxious” affect and who may be the recipients of harsh or affectively insensitive discipline will find it difficult to develop strategies for regulating fearful and self-conscious affect. Such children are at risk for development of internalizing regulation strategies. However, recent research also shows that in some circumstances, temperamentally inhibited children may also develop toward the externalizing pathway and become highly aggressive. This is represented in Pathway F (victim-aggressor) can occur in situations in which temperamentally inhibited children are raised in dysfunctional or violent families and/or who may be rejected by their peers (Watson, Fischer, & Andreas & Smith, 2004).

This model is supported by the results of a series of different research programs addressing the development of self-conscious emotions, rule internalization and aggression. In a series of elegant longitudinal studies, Kochanska and her colleagues (Kochanska, 1993, 1997; 2002; Kochanska, Gross, Lin & Nichols, 2002; Kochanska & Murray, 2002) have identified different pathways in the development of conscience as a function of children’s temperamental and parental socialization. Kochanska (1997) reported that for children who exhibit “fearful” or “inhibited” temperamental dispositions during toddlerhood, gentle parental discipline predicted the development of rule internalization and guilt-like emotion when children were four and five years of age. In contrast, among less fearful children, mutual responsiveness and secure attachment were more potent predictors of conscience. For both types of children, anxious or fearful arousal evoked by parental discipline seems to affect rule internalization for such children. For “fearful” children, negatively-charged disciplinary strategies cause levels of emotional upset not conducive to rule internalization, apparently because they are generally fearful without any negative discipline. In contrast, parents of less fearful children must resort to other strategies to foster the development of conscience, because for such children, fear needs to be induced to create rule internalization. The attachment relationship provides a stable

platform from which parents can evoke fear safely to promote the development of conscience (Kochanska, 2002; Kochanska & Murray, 2000).

Kochanska's distinction between fearful and less fearful socialization patterns provides the empirical foundation for normative Pathways A (positive/normative) and C (inhibited/normative) depicted in Figure 3. In addition, it is likely that other affective states also bias development in the direction of guilt. Several theorists have suggested a strong role for empathy in the genesis of interpersonal guilt and pro-social behavior (Baumeister, Stillwell & Heatherton, 1994; Hoffman, 2000). These latter considerations suggest that experiences of empathy may mediate development along normative Pathway A (positive-normative). Finally, the idea that gentle discipline fosters the development of conscience in "fearful" children suggests that the presence of harsh or emotionally intense discipline strategies may tilt development toward Pathway E (inhibited/internalizing).

Guilt has often been viewed as an important element of conscience. Using the broken-toy paradigm (Barrett, Cole and Zahn-Waxler, 1993), Kochanska (1997; 2002; Kochanska & Murray, 2000) observed that "fearful" toddlers exhibited higher levels of guilt-like affect than less fearful toddlers. Consistent with the previous findings on the relationship between parental discipline and rule internalization (Hoffman, 1970; 2000; Zahn-Waxler and Radke-Yarrow, 1984), Kochanska (1997) found that parents who used power-assertive techniques had children who showed relatively low levels of guilt-like behavior and rule internalization. Although Kochanska (1997) concluded that fearful temperament biases children toward the development of guilt, in her studies, Kochanska defined "guilt" rather broadly to include indicators that are also typical of shame states (e.g., gaze aversion, covering the face, bodily tension). As a result, it is difficult to identify the roles of guilt versus shame in the genesis of rule internalization in these studies. In Chinese culture, socialization focuses heavily on shaming techniques, and shame and guilt seem to function differently from in North America (Li et al., 2004; Mascolo et al., 2002).

Research conducted by Tangney and her colleagues bears on this distinction (Tangney & Dreary, 2002). In a series of research studies using self-reports from children and adults, Tangney examined how guilt and shame differentially bias individuals toward specific social behaviors and experiences. Her research proceeds from the view that guilt and shame are distinguishable emotional states that modulate social behavior in different ways (Tangney, Miller, Flicker & Barlow, 1996; Tangney & Leary, 2002). In a variety of studies, Tangney has demonstrated relations between measures of shame-proneness and indices of poor responses to anger, indirect aggression and hostility, poor anger regulation, externalization of blame, and psychopathology (Tangney, Wagner, Hill-Barlow, Marschall & Gramzow, 1996; Tangney et al., 1996; Tangney, Wagner & Gramzow, 1992). In contrast, measures of guilt proneness are related to constructive anger management, willingness to make reparations in relationships, and other pro-social dispositions. Of particular importance, Tangney et al. (1992) reported that “shame-free” guilt was inversely related to measures of the externalization of blame and several indices of anger and hostility.

Although Tangney’s studies were not performed with toddlers, they suggest the importance of differentiating shame- and guilt-proneness as important developmental biases, at least in Western cultures. As indicated above, Barrett, Cole and Zahn-Waxler (1993) were able to differentiate toddlers into “avoiders” and “amenders” on the basis of their reactions in the broken toy task. Taken together, these studies suggest the need to differentiate shame-mediated from guilt-mediated developmental pathways. Tangney’s work suggests that the development of “shame-free” guilt may be important in the development of pro-social moral selves depicted in Pathway A.

A third line of research is related to the developmental roots of anger and aggression spurred by social cognitive models of anger. Research suggests that children as young as three years of age who display a tendency toward reactive aggression hold a *hostile attribution bias* (Crick & Dodge, 1994; Katsurada, & Sugawara, 1998). Such children are more likely to

attribute hostile intent to a peer's negative or ambiguous social actions. Research suggests that relative to normative samples, children who display a tendency toward reactive aggression are more likely to exhibit difficult temperament organized around angry affect (Pettit, 1998); a history of punitive, hostile or abusive parenting (Dodge, Pettit, Bates & Valente, 1995); insecure attachment (Pettit, 1998); peer rejection (Yoon, Hughes, Cavell & Thompson, 2000); and indiscriminant or enabling reactions to aggression in the home (Dumas, LaFreniere & Serketich, 1996).

This research, taken together with work that demonstrates a link between shame and anger (Li et al., 2004; Scheff, 1987; Tangney et al., 1996) provides empirical support for the distinction between Pathways A and C in Figure 3. Children with negative emotional biases who receive harsh or permissive discipline have difficulty developing effective social skills or regulatory skills for aggression (Mascolo & Margolis, 2005; Rubin et al., 1998). Reactive anger in such children is likely to arise jointly both as a reaction to feelings of shame as well as poor self-regulation skills. Conversely, children whose aggressive impulses are consistently regulated using firm and responsive discipline can develop toward normative endpoints, especially in children exhibiting dispositions toward higher levels of self-control.

Finally, Pathway F (victim-aggressor) is supported by recent research showing that under certain circumstances, a temperamentally inhibited children can develop aggressive behavioral styles. In a longitudinal study, Watson, Fischer, Andreas & Smith (2004) assessed children between the ages of 7 and 13 on a variety of parental-report measures of children's temperamental dispositions, aggressiveness, self-esteem, parental practices and a variety of other variables. Families were culled from a multi-racial sample that was representative of the entire community of Springfield, Massachusetts. This community-based sample differed from those used in many other studies in that it did not sample children who were explicitly at risk for the development of aggressive behavior. Watson et al. (2004) found that children who were inhibited, especially in combination with anxiety and other problems, showed a strong tendency

to become aggressive, especially when they grew up in violent homes. These findings are consistent with those that address the origins of aggression exhibited by children who perpetrate school shootings, such as those that occurred in Columbine High School in Colorado. Several studies (Harter & Whitesell, 1999; McGee & DeBernardo, 1999) suggest that school shooters tend to be (a) withdrawn children, often described as “loners”, who interact with others in a non-assertive fashion who (b) have a history of being humiliated, teased or taunted by peers; (c) exhibit low and unstable levels of self-esteem; (d) come from dysfunctional families; (e) exhibit high levels of aggressive and suicidal ideation, and a high interest in and access to guns and related activities. These studies, along with the results of the Watson et al. (2004) study, suggest pathway toward the development of a victim-aggressor behavior pattern in inhibited children.

Self-evaluative and moral emotions emerge and undergo significant transformation during the toddler years. As indicated in Figure 3, the epigenetic development of emotions like anger, shame and guilt has important implications the development of children’s social behavior and sense of self. Different pathways in the development of stable styles of social behavior emerge as products of relations between children’s temperamental dispositions and social experiences. As such, there is no single pathway in the development of pro- or anti-social behavior. The development and regulation of emotions like anger, guilt and shame play a major role in mediating the development of normative and rule-violating modes of social behavior. In this way, the socialization of styles of emotional self-regulation and self-evaluation during the toddler years sets the stage for the development of social behavior and interpersonal relationships over the course of ontogenesis. Directive socialization experiences that are sensitive to a toddler’s emerging self-evaluative and emotional dispositions tend to promote shame-free, pro-social development. In contrast, emotional dysregulation in the formative years can set the stage for the development of both internalizing and shame-mediated externalizing pathology in development.

### **Foundations of Selfhood through the Toddler Years**

The toddler years are fundamental ones for the development of self. Building upon profound changes that occur in the second year of life, the self arises in development as a form of reflective activity. The self emerges as conscious action gains the capacity to take itself as its own object, reflecting upon itself (Mead, 1934). However, the self is not a solitary construction; it is a social product. Selves develop in interactions in which parents and other socialization agents use words and other communicative vehicles to direct a child's constructive processes to aspects of his or her own action and experience. The construction of a sense of self is a foundational achievement in development. The sense of self functions as a center for organizing experience. With development, valued images of self increasingly operate as social and moral guides to action.

Emotion plays a central role in organizing action, experience and development. It follows that self-conscious and moral emotions are central organizers of the experience of self. Disciplinary encounters are salient occasions for the construction of moral rules and the social formation of emotions such as shame and guilt. Anger displays by young children are also situations for discipline. Emotions that arise in disciplinary and related encounters play an important role in the development and internalization of social standards that constitute moral selves. However, the emotions that arise in disciplinary encounters are not simply matters of socialization. Different pathways in the development of self and self-conscious emotion arise from coactions between the children's emotional biases and socialization experiences. Through such encounters, selves and self-conscious emotions develop with reference to each other.

Shame, guilt and anger develop; they do not emerge fully formed at a single point in ontogenesis. Figure 2 depicts *normative* pathways in the development of anger, guilt and shame in toddlers in North American and Western European cultures. As self-evaluative and moral emotions, shame, guilt and anger develop in different ways under different social and cultural contexts. For example, shame and guilt develop along different trajectories and

through different processes in Asian cultures (Mascolo et al., 2002; Fung & Chen, 2001). In addition, as indicated in Figure 3, even within Western cultures, variations in the ways in which children's enactments of anger, shame and guilt are socialized can prompt divergent pathways in children's self-evaluative, socio-emotional and moral development. In this way, the emergence of self-evaluative and moral awareness during the toddler years sets the stage for the social and cultural development of self and social relations.

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
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**Table 1**  
**The Anatomy of Anger, Guilt and Shame**


<b>Emotion Family</b>	<b>Motive</b>	<b>Appraisal ← → Violation</b>	<b>Feeling Tone/Bodily Transformation</b>	<b>Action Tendencies</b>
<b>Anger</b>	Maintain desired states and conditions that "ought" to exist	Violation of socio-moral standards by blameworthy other	Strengthening of will to move against other and remove the violation. The experience described with metaphors like "heat," "tension"; "pressure"; "feel like exploding", etc.	Move against the other to remove the violation; physical, verbal or symbolic attack; indirect aggression or attack.
<b>Guilt</b>	Maintain socio-moral standards; maintain sense of self as moral person	Self is responsible for socio-moral condition	Sense of feeling "weighed down"; "heavy"; as if there is a "sinking" or "tugging" feeling in one's chest.	Remove socio-moral violation by making reparations; fixing the situation; apologizing; confessing wrongdoing.
<b>Shame</b>	Maintain positive social identity in eyes of other and self	Self aware that Other sees flawed self or identity	Sense of self as feeling "small" or "this big"; face feels "exposed"	Desire to hide the self; hid the face; withdraw from social scrutiny; Shame → anger cycle

**Figure 1**  
**Self as Reflective Experience**




**Figure 1: Self as a Reflective Process.** The base gray arrow represents a child's primary action-on-objects. Emotional action is composed of an integration of appraisal, affective feeling, and overt action. In social contexts, self-awareness emerges as the actions and words of others function to direct constructive activity back onto the self's activities. In this way, self-awareness involves acts of reflecting consciousness back upon itself. In development, self-awareness increasingly operates as a moral guide to action and experience.

**Figure 2**  
**Developmental Changes in the Skills for Anger, Guilt and Shame**



**Figure 2: Developmental Changes in the Dynamic Structure of Anger, Guilt and Shame.** Emotional skill diagrams depicting changes in socio-moral emotions in development. The structure of the diagrams is depicted in the box in the lower left hand corner of Figure 2. Using skill theory (Fischer, 1980), the shaded portion of the diagram reflects the structure of the child's appraisal activity. The lower (unshaded) portion, connected to appraisal structures with a dotted line identifies the structure of emotion action-tendencies. The structure above the shaded portion of the diagram identifies the structure of emotional control elements. The regulation function of control elements is indicated using bi-directional curved arrows. For some diagrams, the structure of adult action is provided to the right of the emotional skill diagram for the child. The arrow between the adult and child structures indicates the flow of action from the adult to the child. Plus and minus signs indicated the motivational valence (positive or negative) of the skill element in question. For emotions at the sensori-motor level, appraisal activity and action tendencies are represented together because, at this level, appraisal processes are embedded within sensori-motor action. The changes specified reflect changes typical of North American and Western European children. At any given age, the particular structure of emotional action varies with context, child, culture, affective state, and other important factors.

**Figure 3**  
**Pathways in the Development of Self-Evaluative and Socio-Moral Emotions**



**Figure 3: Pathways in the Development of Self-Evaluative Moral Emotion.** Figure 3 depicts six pathways in self-conscious emotional development that occur as a product of different relations between children's temperamental dispositions (involving both affective and self-regulatory biases) and parenting practices. Pathways A, B and C are normative pathways (bolded) in which self-conscious moral emotion develops in the direction of empathic, shame-free guilt and pro-social behavior. In the *positive affect/normative outcome* (Pathway A), among children who exhibit dispositions toward positive and/or empathic affect and high capacity for self control, responsive and inductive discipline fosters pro-social development. In children who exhibit negative affect but high capacity for self-control, firm regulation can foster pro-social emotion (Pathway C). Contrastively, gentle redirection fosters sociality among inhibited or socially fearful children (Pathway B). Three non-normative pathways are depicted. Among children who exhibit negative affect and low levels of self control, harsh, abusive or permissive parenting fosters development in the direction of the shame-anger cycle (Pathway E). In contrast, self-conscious negative internalization can develop in inhibited children under conditions of harsh or permissive discipline (Pathway D), neither of which provides re-direction toward secure social relationships. Finally, in some circumstances, rejected-inhibited children can develop externalizing pathology, as exhibited among school-shooters and the inhibited victim-aggressor profile (Pathway F).