Dynamic Development of Component Systems of Emotions:

Pride, Shame, and Guilt in China and the United States

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Three-year-old Danny and his mother are putting together the pieces of a puzzle. Danny places a piece in its correct location. Immediately, he looks up to his mother, smiles, and says “Oh! I did it!” Looking up from her work, his mother smiles and says “You did it!” Danny claps his hands, after which his mother applauds and says “That’s great!” (Pride exhibited by U.S. child and mother)

Mother asks three-year-old Lin to sing a song for guests. After she finishes, with smiles and exaggerated expressions, the guests say "Wonderful! You sing nicer than my child!" Mother replies, "Hai-hao, she is O.K. Her voice is kind of off the tune, though. But she likes to sing.” To Lin, You did all right, but now you need more practice. Play down your success!" (Chinese mother and guests reacting to child's song).

Reactions of college students to compliments about their class presentations in science (Chen, 1993): “Thanks. I feel good about it. I’m so glad you enjoyed it.” (American students)

“No. It’s not that great. I didn’t do it well. I know I bored you. I’m embarrassed.” (Chinese students)

These vignettes depict typical emotional reactions to accomplishment in American and Chinese children and adults. In so doing, they not only show the very different ways in which socialization agents react to children’s accomplishments in the USA and China, but they also illustrate typical developmental outcomes spawned by these practices. The latter responses described above demonstrate differences in the ways in which American and Chinese adults respond in the context of being praised for producing worthy outcomes. The modal response in Americans is to accept praise, and even to express their own pride in their accomplishments. In contrast, the modal response to praise among Chinese individuals is modest self-effacement and embarrassment (Chen, 1993). The first two vignettes suggest ways in which American and Chinese parents socialize these disparate emotional orientations. Parents of children in the U.S. tend to praise their children’s accomplishments and encourage positive self-expression (Mascolo & Harkins, 1998; Stipek, 1995). In contrast, in the presence of their child, Chinese parents often make effacing remarks to others about their children’s efforts. Guests and relatives, however, generally lavish praise upon the child, often effacing their own children in the process

These vignettes suggest that emotional reactions to accomplishment not only undergo considerable change in ontogenesis, but can also develop along different pathways in different cultures. Whereas Americans often experience pride in their accomplishments (Mascolo & Fischer, 1995), pride is explicitly discouraged among the Chinese (Chen, 1993; Stipek, 1999; Wu, 1996). Instead, Chinese individuals are motivated to harmonize the self with others through self-effacement. These observations raise important

questions. What does it mean to say that emotions develop? What are the processes by which emotions undergo change in ontogenesis? What are the contributions of biology, cognition, individual action, social interaction, and culture in promoting and shaping emotional development?

To address these questions we first develop a dynamic component-systems approach to understanding emotional development, which is based in dynamic skill theory and specifies how cognitive, emotional, and social processes work together in emotional development (Fischer & Bidell, 1998; Fischer, Shaver, & Carnochan, 1990; Mascolo & Harkins, 1998; Mascolo & Fischer, 1995; Mascolo, Harkins, & Harakal, in press; Scherer, 1994). A component systems approach proceeds from the assertion that emotional states and experiences are composed of partially distinct appraisal, affective, and overt action systems that function within particular sociocultural contexts. As evidenced by research and theory, emotions arise through the mutual regulation of component systems within specific contexts and in ontogenesis. For example, experiences of pride in the U.S. are composed of a prototypical pattern of appraisal ("I am responsible for a valued outcome"), phenomenal experience (e.g., feeling bigger; joyful qualia), and action (e.g., showing one's worthy outcome to others). These component processes dynamically influence each other in the evolution and constitution of an emotional state. Component systems not only adjust themselves to each other within individuals, but they also mutually regulate each other between individuals. Although emotions emerge through the interaction among systems that exist within individuals, they do not consist of discrete states that are encased within individuals. Instead, they are context-sensitive: Within a given context, emotions are modulated as appraisal-affect-action processes that adjust themselves not only to each other but also to the ongoing and anticipated actions of others (Fogel, 1993).

After an articulation of a dynamic component systems approach to emotions, we examine the ways in which emotions undergo development in ontogenesis. To the extent that emotions are composed of multiple component processes, it follows that they undergo developmental transformation as the systems that compose them change in relation to each other (Sroufe, 1996). Further, like all psychological processes, emotional assemblies develop through dynamic interactions among biological, individual, and sociocultural processes (Gottlieb, 1997; Bidell & Fischer, 1996; Fischer & Bidell, 1998; Mascolo, Pollack, & Fischer, 1997). As a result of variation in biological (e.g., temperament), individual (e.g., preferred goals and motives, skills), and sociocultural (e.g., cultural values and beliefs) processes, emotions can develop along a variety of pathways. To realize these principles in actual developing activities, we use dynamic skill theory (Fischer, 1980; Fischer, Shaver & Carnochan, 1990; Mascolo & Fischer, 1995; Mascolo, Pollack, & Fischer, 1997) to chart alternative pathways in the development of pride and shame in China and the U.S. We first analyze similarities and differences in the cultural values and meaning systems that frame the development

of pride and shame in the USA and China. Having articulated idealized forms of pride and shame in these cultures, we organize existing research within the dynamic skill framework and chart alternative pathways in the development of appraisal skills for pride and shame in China and the USA.

A Dynamic Component Systems Approach to Emotion

A dynamic component systems approach (Fischer, Shaver, & Carnochan, 1990; Mascolo & Harkins, 1998; Mascolo & Fischer, 1998; Mascolo, Pollack, & Fischer, 1997) proceeds from four basic assertions. The first is that emotional states and experiences are composed of multiple component processes (Scherer, 1994). Second, emotional experiences emerge and evolve both on-line and in development through the mutual regulation (Fischer & Bidell, 1998; Fogel, 1993; M. D. Lewis, 1996) of component systems over time and within particular social contexts. Third, component systems are multi-leveled, composed of hierarchies of skills that include social-emotional components of differing levels of complexity, as illustrated by analyses of skill development. In our discussion, this point is incorporated into the other assertions, because it is so pervasive. Fourth, they are socially sensitive and co-regulated, meaning that they adjust themselves not only to each other but also to continuous changes in other people and events in a social interaction. As a result, within particular social contexts, emotional experiences self-organize (Fischer & Bidell, 1998; Fogel, 1993; M. D. Lewis, 1996; Lewis & Granic, in press) into a series of more or less stable patterns that yield a large number of minor variations (Camras, 1992; Mascolo, Harkins, & Harakal, in press).

Component Processes of Emotional States and Experiences

The first assertion of a dynamic component systems view is that emotional episodes are composed of multiple component processes. This is an assumption that is common to functionalist (Campos, 1994; Barrett, 1998; Frijda & Mesquita, 1998), social process (Fogel et al., 1992; Dickson, Messinger, & Fogel, 1998), and systems (Lewis & Granic, in press; Mascolo & Harkins, 1998) approaches to emotion.

One important class of component processes consists of appraisal. Appraisals refer to assessments of relations between perceived events and a person's goals, motives, and concerns (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991). Like the emotional syndromes of which they are a part, appraisals themselves are composed of multiple components, including sensory-perceptual, cognitive-representational, and motivational processes. It is important to note that although appraisal processes involve cognitive processes (i.e., the processing of information in terms of existing knowledge structures), appraisal is not simply a cognitive affair. Instead, in emotional appraisal, cognitive representations of events function in the service of an individual's goals, motives, and concerns (Smith & Lazarus, 1991). To be sure, cognitive processes are essential in representing one's motives and concerns and in mediating an individual's interpretation of any given event.

Nonetheless, appraisals in emotion are more about the fate of one's motives than about cognitive processes per se (Roseman, 1984).

Further, appraisals are the products of both conscious and non-conscious processes. At any given time, an individual's appraisal systems are active in monitoring enormous amounts of sensory data that are made available from one's ongoing activity in the world. Much of this processing proceeds without conscious awareness. Persons only become aware of the products of such appraisal activity when those products have significance for them – that is, when they implicate one's most important goals, motives, and concerns (Roseman, 1984). Appraisals that events are consistent with an individual's goals, motives, and concerns play a role in the generation of positively valenced emotions; assessments that events are motive-inconsistent participate in negatively valenced experiences. Distinctions among different categories of emotional experience are attributable, in part, to both gross and subtle differences in the ways in which persons appraise events (Lazarus, 1999; Mascolo & Griffin, 1998; Mikula, Scherer, & Athenstaedt, 1998; Parkinson, 1999; Robinson, 1998; Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1990; Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 1996).

From a component systems view, appraisals do not simply function as discrete "elicitors" that precede or "cause" an emotion to come into play. Instead, they are seen as part and parcel of the emotional experience itself. An important justification for this assertion is that emotions are intentional states (Brentano, 1874; Campos, 1994; Searle, 1980; Solomon, 1976). That is, emotions have objects; they are about something. A person is not simply angry or proud; Jan is angry that I was late for our appointment; I am proud of myself for having achieved a high grade in physics. The idea that emotions take objects suggests that emotions involve judgments or appraisals as important, albeit not privileged, parts of their very constitution (Solomon, 1990).

A second class of emotion systems includes affect systems. From a component systems view, different emotional states are accompanied by distinct, emotion-typical feeling tones (Kagan, 1984) and phenomenal experiences (de Rivera, 1981). Affect systems refer to the biological and bodily processes that contribute to the experience of emotion-typical feeling tone and phenomenal states, including components in the central nervous system (CNS) and autonomic nervous system (ANS). Affect systems are partially distinct from appraisal and action components, which simply means that different brain and bodily structures and processes often, but not always, mediate their production.

A large and growing body of research indicates that diverse patterns of CNS and ANS activity contribute to variations in the constitution and phenomenal experience of different emotions and emotional behaviors. For example, Gray (1990, 1994; Gray et al., 1991) has described different anatomical structures in the brain (including the limbic system and basal ganglia) that appear to mediate each of three basic

emotional systems he has proposed (i.e., behavioral approach, fight/flight, and behavioral inhibition systems). (See also Davidson, 1992, MacLean, 1990, and Panksepp et al., 1998 for similar analyses.) Ledoux (1992) has argued convincingly for the role of the amygdala in the mediation of fear and other emotional states. Panksepp (1998; Panksepp, Knutson, & Pruitt, 1998) has reviewed a large number of studies demonstrating the role of specific anatomical, neurochemical, and hormonal systems in the mediation of different emotional behaviors and dispositions in mammals (e.g., distress, nurturance, dominance, etc.). Other researchers have demonstrated asymmetries in brain activation (e.g., frontal lobe activity) in the processing of different emotions (Dawson, 1994; Fox, 1991). Finally, although findings are inconsistent (Cacioppo, Berntson, Klein, & Poehlmann, 1998), researchers have demonstrated a degree of ANS specificity in the experience of different emotions (Ekman, Levenson, & Friesen, 1983; Levenson, Carstensen, Friesen, & Ekman, 1991; Levenson, Ekman, & Friesen, 1990).

Research suggests some modularity among appraisal, action, and affect-producing systems, but appraisal, affect, and action systems are not entirely separate and distinct. For example, the very brain areas that researchers have identified as emotion systems (e.g., the amygdala, hypothalamus, frontal lobe, etc.) are also heavily involved in the mediation of cognitive, memorial, and overt action processes (Bell & Fox, 1994; Davidson, 1994; Dawson, 1984; Ledoux, 1992). In this way, the biological mediators of affect, appraisal, and action are somewhat distinct yet fully intertwined, even in brain anatomy. Similarly, research on emotion physiology does not support a single undifferentiated state of physiological (ANS) arousal fir different emotional experiences (Mandler, 1984; Schachter & Singer, 1962), but at the same time it aksi does not support the existence of unique neurobiological patterns for different emotional experiences. It is more likely that physiology discriminates emotional experiences in complex, non-linear ways. For example, Cacioppo, Berntson, and Klein (1992) demonstrated that the same pattern of somatovisceral activity can be associated with reports of very different emotions. Conversely, reports of the same emotion can be sustained in the context of different patterns of somatovisceral activity. Thus, given the state of current evidence, it is most prudent to conclude that affect and appraisal systems are partially distinct and richly interactive.

A third class of component emotional experiences involves overt action tendencies, which consist of the propensity to want things and to do particular actions in the context of a given type of appraised event and affective experience. Like appraisal and affect systems, overt action systems are themselves composed of a series of interlocking subsystems. These include both emotion-typical involuntary (e.g., facial and vocal) and instrumental/communicative activity. Emotion-typical action tendencies serve adaptive functions for persons and their social groups. They not only function in the service of the local goals and

concerns implicated in a person's appraisal of a given event, but they also function to preserve broader psychological concerns beyond the immediate context, and they are affected by social and cultural contexts. They function to regulate social behavior and to maintain cultural and moral standards shared within a given social community.

Insert Table 1 About Here

A dynamic component systems approach differentiates between the concepts of emotional state and emotional experience (M. Lewis, 1998). An emotional state refers to the specific patterning of an individual's appraisal, affect, and action systems in the context of notable changes in one's relation to one's environs. An emotional experience refers to the phenomenal aspects of the various components of an emotional state.[1] Table 1 provides a representation of prototypical appraisals, phenomenal experiences, and action tendencies for several categories of emotion. For example, experiences of anger among Western adults often involve appraisals that events are contrary to the way they ought to be (de Rivera, 1981; Fischer, Shaver, & Carnochan, 1990; Mascolo & Griffin, 1998). Such appraisals may be accompanied by patterned bodily changes, including CNS and ANS activity, increased heart rate, perspiration, and bodily temperature (Barrett & Campos, 1987; Ekman, Levenson, & Friesen, 1983). The phenomenal experience of anger characteristically involves "angry" feeling tone or qualia as well the bodily experience of "heat," "pressure," or "tension." Persons experience a strengthening of will which supports the action tendency to remove the conditions judged as contrary to how they should be and to look for someone or something to blame (de Rivera, 1981; Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & O'Connor, 1987).

Mutual Regulation among Component Emotion Systems

A central principle of a component systems approach is that although component emotion systems function as relatively distinct systems, they are not independent of one another. Instead they mutually regulate each other in the formation of any given emotional state or experience (Fischer & Bidell, 1998; Fogel, 1993; M. D. Lewis, 1995, 1996; M. D. Lewis & Douglas, 1998; Mascolo & Harkins, 1998; Mascolo, Harkins, & Harakal, in press). Mutual regulation refers to the processes by which component systems adjust themselves to the ongoing (and anticipated) outputs and activity of each other (Fogel, 1993). We use the concept of mutual regulation broadly to refer to both positive and negative feedback processes, which are central to the ways that emotions self-organize. Through mutual regulation, component systems modulate each other's activity simultaneously and continuously. As such, there is no fixed or preset sequence of psychological events that occurs in the generation and constitution of emotion; no single component system is privileged in the constitution of emotional events. Figure 1 depicts a dynamic component systems model of the emotion process. Each individual represented in the model is composed of three classes of

component systems (appraisal, affect, and action) that mutually regulate each other. The double arrows between component systems denote mutual regulation. To explicate the concept of mutual regulation, we draw on existing theory and research to articulate the specific influences that each component system has on each other system throughout the emotion process.

Insert Figure 1 About Here

Appraisal-affect relations. At any given time, appraisal processes continuously monitor the significance of all classes of event-related input in parallel, as well as the activity of ongoing affect-producing systems; and much of this monitoring proceeds nonconsciously (Marcel, 1984). A large body of research demonstrates relations between different types of event appraisals and affective feeling tone (Lazarus, 1991; Mascolo & Griffin, 1998; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985, 1987; Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1991; Scherer, 1997; Weiner, 1985). A different body of research indicates the ways in which cognitive engagement or disengagement in relation to stressful events modulates physiological and affective responses (Averill, Malmstrom, Koriat, & Lazarus, 1972; Koriat, Melman, Averill, & Lazarus, 1972). The influence of affective state on appraisal and cognitive processes has ample empirical support as well. Isen (1990) has demonstrated that the presence of positive affect can facilitate the process of remembering positive information, enhance problem solving, and generally promote flexibility, breadth, and creativity in an individual's attempt to organize information. Negative affect (e.g. sadness), on the other hand, appears to restrict attention and cognitive organization to the local demands of a given task (see also Forgas, 1991).

As appraisals shape and modify existing affect, affective systems provide simultaneous and continuous feedback to appraisal systems, functioning to amplify and select for conscious awareness and further action some of the very appraisals that helped initiate affective reactions in the first place (Brown, 1994; Brown & Kozak, 1998; M. D. Lewis, 1996; Mascolo & Harkins, 1998). As appraisals are selected, they continue to evolve, producing further affective changes that bias and continue to organize appraisal and activity (Lewis, 1996; Lewis & Douglas, 1998). Thus, affect and appraisal mutually regulate each other in real time. As a result, it is not helpful to privilege either affect or appraisal as primary aspects of the emotion process (M. D. Lewis, 1995, 1996; Lewis & Douglas, 1998; M. Lewis, Sullivan, & Michalson, 1984).

Affect-action relations. Not only do affective processes organize event appraisals, they also activate and organize emotion-typical classes of action tendencies, and action tendencies in turn feed back to affective states. Some theorists have speculated that action tendencies are a major source of the "affective feel" of emotional experiences themselves (Frijda & Mesquita, 1998, although Frijda rejects the notion of emotion-typical qualia). A variety of studies have supported the proposition that reports of different emotions are associated with universal and emotion-typical patterns of involuntary facial expressions (Ekman, 1989;

Ekman & Friesen, 1971). More recent research has suggested that different basic emotional states may be associated with different contours of vocal and postural activity as well (Banse & Scherer, 1996; Fernald, 1996; Mumme, Fernald, & Herrera, 1996; Wallbott, 1998). Further, different affective experiences are associated with the production broad classes of instrumental action. Commonly accepted examples of emotion-typical instrumental action tendencies are displayed in Table 1.

A large body of research supports the contention that moods and emotional states bias behavioral dispositions. For example, research demonstrates the ways in which moods bias individuals toward or away from a variety of different behaviors, including helping and cooperation (Salovey, Mayer, & Rosenhan, 1991; Soames, 1987), self-destruction (Leith & Baumeister, 1996), polite conversation, (Forgas, 1997, 1999), parenting (Holden, Coleman, & Schmidt, 1995; Jouriles & O'Leary,1990), and behavior in variety of other social domains and interpersonal contexts (Forgas & Klaus, 1996; Hertel, 1999; Munz & Fallert, 1998). In an intriguing study that demonstrates how subtle differences in individual emotions bias behavior, deRivera and his colleagues induced states of elation and gladness by manipulating whether people were successful in attaining an unrealistic "wished for" outcome or more realistic "hoped for" goal (de Rivera, Possell, Verette, & Weiner, 1989). Persons who reported elation indicated feeling "higher off the ground" and made more exaggerated judgments of the length of a line than did persons made to feel glad. Such findings indicate how differences in affective states can transform a person's bodily sense and behavioral disposition.

The relation between affect and action tendencies is not unidirectional. Action tendencies provide feedback that amplifies and modulates affective states and feeling tone (Fischer, Shaver, & Carnochan, 1990). In a variety of studies, individuals who have been instructed to produce emotion-typical facial configurations report enhanced experiences of those emotions (Hess, Kappas, McHugo, Lanzetta, & Kleck, 1992; Laird, 1984; Tourangeau & Ellsworth, 1979). These studies provide support for a weak version of the facial feedback hypothesis (Laird, 1984; Matsumoto, 1987; Tourangeau & Ellsworth, 1979): Feedback from emotion-typical facial activity can intensify or precipitate mild experiences of individual emotions but is not a necessary or sufficient precondition for emotional experience (Cacioppo, Berntson, Klein, & Poehlmann, 1998). There is also evidence that emotion movements and postures can induce mild experiences of individual emotions as well (Cacioppo, Priester, & Bernston, 1993; Cacioppo, Berntson, Klein, & Poelmann, 1998; Riskind, 1984).

Appraisal-action relations. Appraisal and overt action processes also mutually regulate each other. Specifically, motive-relevant appraisals specify the goals that guide and direct overt action, which is consistent with control theory approaches to action (Carver & Scheier, 1982; Mascolo, Fischer, & Neimeyer,

1999; Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960; Powers, 1973). Conversely, overt actions result in environmental changes that provide feedback about the fate of a person's goals, motives, and concerns. Appraisals thus continuously monitor the extent to which goals, motives, and concerns have been met. In this way, overt actions are deployed and revised until appraisal-relevant goals are either met or abandoned. Changes in the goals and concerns implicated in event appraisals prompt the deployment of new action tendencies.

Both appraisals and affective processes organize the production of overt action. However, with psychological development, appraisals become mediated by increasingly sophisticated systems of personal, social, and cultural meaning. Whereas affective processes bias actions in terms of broad behavioral preferences, appraisals draw upon a dynamic knowledge base to guide action in ways that are sensitive to the demands of particular social contexts. With development, individuals draw upon knowledge that supports the construction of increasingly sophisticated event interpretations (Fischer, Shaver, & Carnochan, 1990; Mascolo & Griffin, 1998; Sroufe, 1996), strategies to advance one's goals and concerns in social contexts (Saarni, 1984), and rules for appropriate emotional communication (Barrett & Nelson-Goens, 1997), display (Averill, 1982; Saarni, 1984; 1990), and even feeling (Briggs, 1970; Hochschild, 1979).

Social Sensitivity and Co-regulation

Thus far, we have discussed the co-regulation of components of the emotion process as they occur within individuals, but emotional episodes are co-regulated between people as well as within. Just as component systems adjust to each other within persons, they also continuously adjust themselves to inputs and meanings that arise between individuals. The co-regulation of emotion between persons is represented in terms of the double arrows located between interacting individuals in Figure 1. In social interaction, an individual's appraisal-affect-action systems change continuously as they adjust to each other as well as to the ongoing and anticipated actions of a social partner(s). In face-to-face interaction of mother and child, for example, a mother's continuous changes in facial and vocal activities directly influence her infant's ongoing and subsequent facial actions (Fogel et al., 1991; Trevarthen, 1984).

Fogel and his colleagues have investigated how different types of social interactions modulate emotional facial acts, with subtle differences emerging from social co-regulation. In one study, specific types of smiles occurred for different types of play interactions between parents and their 12-month-olds (Dickson, Fogel, & Messinger, 1998). The researchers differentiated between basic (lip corners raised), play (corners of lips raised/jaw drops), and Duchenne (lip corners and cheeks raised) expressions. Basic smiles were most strongly associated with book reading, Duchenne smiles with vocal play, and play smiles with physical play. Infant laughter also differs in form and function in different social contexts (Dickson, Walker, & Fogel, 1997; Nwokah, Davies, Islam, Hsu, & Fogel, 1993; Nwokah, Hsu, Dobrowolska, & Fogel, 1994). The continuously

evolving actions of co-participants in interactions constitute an actual part of the emotion process. Emotion processes are not encased within individuals but adjust continuously to each other between people as well as within.

Self-Organization of Dynamic Emotion Families

Within a given sociocultural context, emotional states and experience emerge through the mutual regulation of component systems both within and between individuals, with no single component system being primary. Emotional episodes self-organize through mutual regulation of component systems both in development and in real time in particular contexts (Fischer, Shaver, & Carnochan, 1990; Fogel, 1993; M.D. Lewis, 1996; Lewis & Granic, in press; Mascolo, Harkins, & Harakal, in press; Thelen, 1994). The concept of self-organization stipulates that there is no single plan that directs the formation of any particular emotional reaction), but biology and culture constrain and shape the co-actions of components systems over time to take specific shapes (Barrett & Campos, 1997; Fischer, Wang, Kennedy, & Cheng, 1998; Fogel et al., 1992; Mascolo, Harkins, & Harakal, in press).

In theory, the number of particular ways that component systems can combine to produce different emotional states is extremely large, but when component systems mutually regulate each other, they reduce the degrees of freedom that other component systems have to operate (Camras, 1995; Fogel, 1993). Emotions thus tend to settle into a finite number of fairly stable patterns, syndromes, or families. Emotions within a given category or family (e.g., anger, love, shame) bear a family resemblance (Rosch, 1975; Russell, 1990) to each other. That is, emotions fit into a given family not because of sharing characteristics with all members of the family but because of sharing them with category prototypes. For example, in American English, the words sorry, distress, loneliness, and disheartenment are all members of the sadness family, sharing characteristics with the prototype of sadness and also differing in those characteristics.

Shaver, Wu, and Schwartz (1992) attempted to gain an understanding of how people organize emotions into families between and within different cultures. In so doing, they asked people in the United States and China to list as many different types of emotions as they could. One group of participants in each culture rated each of the many resulting terms to determine which words were seen as actual examples of emotions. A second group sorted the highly rated words into categories on the basis of how they go together. Figure 2 depicts the results of a hierarchical cluster analysis of the emotion terms for each culture.

Insert Figure 2 About Here

As indicated in Figure 2, the American and Chinese structures show both commonality and important differences. Emotion families that bear the same meanings in both cultures are indicated with dark lines; emotion families that differ between cultures are marked with dotted lines. At the superordinate

level of the hierarchy, both American and Chinese participants distinguished positive from negative emotions. Moving down the hierarchy, American and Chinese participants grouped emotion terms into basic level families, including anger, sadness, fear, and happiness. At the basic level of categorization, American participants differentiated five emotion families, with three negative (anger, sadness, and fear) and two positive (love and happiness). At the subordinate level, each family was comprised of a number of different subcategories of emotion. In the Chinese data, shame emerged as a sixth basic family, subsuming such emotions as shame and guilt/regret, but shame did not emerge as a basic level emotion family for American participants. In addition, for the Chinese, love was viewed as a negative rather than positive emotion family, "sad love," which included such subordinate emotions as unrequited love and sorrowful love. Thus, Chinese participants differentiated one positive emotion family (happiness) and five negative ones.

The negativity of love in the Chinese emotion taxonomy makes sense culturally. In traditional China, marriages have been arranged by parents. A marriage is seen not only as a marriage between two people but as a joining of two extended families. Romantic love takes on secondary importance and is viewed as a disruptive emotion, with the potential to precipitate conflict between children and parents (Potter, 1988). It has the potential to break down the proper respect and deference that sons are traditionally expected to show their fathers, who have a position of authority and relative emotional distance (Ho, 1996; Potter, 1988; Russell, 1996; Wu, 1984, 1996). This negative prototype does not mean that romantic love is absent but only that it is devalued (Jankowiak, 1993; Russell, 1996).

An even more important difference concerns the emotion of shame. Among the Chinese, shame is a hypercognized emotion, whereas it appears to be hypocognized among Americans (Levy, 1984; Marsella, 1981; Russell, 1996; Shaver, Wu, & Schwartz, 1992; Wang & Leichtman, in press). Unlike American children, Chinese children use the term shame as one of their first emotion words early in development. In contrast, American children produce words for all the emotion categories except shame (love, happiness, anger, fear, and sadness, as well as the dimension of good/bad; Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982; Dunn, Bretherton, and Munn, 1987; Fischer, Shaver, & Carnochan, 1990).

Wang, Li, and Fischer (2000) used methods similar to those of Shaver et al., (1987) to analyze the structure of the shame lexicon among mainland Chinese adults living in the United States and Canada (Wang, 1994). Eighty-three shame-related words were culled from the Modern Chinese Dictionary (Commercial Press, 1978). Ten Chinese adults examined these words and added additional terms, producing a total of 144 shame-related words. An additional sample of twenty Chinese adults rated each of these words on the extent to which they were representative of the emotion of shame. On the basis of these ratings, 31 words were eliminated, resulting in a total of 113 target words. Finally, 52 Chinese adults sorted

these words into categories on the basis of similarities in their meanings. A hierarchical cluster analysis of the resulting sortings produced the organization depicted in Figure 3. Six basic shame families emerged from the sortings at three hierarchical levels (Fischer, Wang, Kennedy, & Cheng, 1998). At the superordinate level, Chinese adults discriminated between shame in the self and in others. At the basic level of the hierarchy, there are three emotion families indicative of shame in the self and three indicative of shame in others. As indicated in Figure 4, each of these basic families subsumes a series of lower level subordinate families as well. Because of the weak differentiation of shame in English, the Chinese elaboration of shame is informative.

The three shame-in-self families are fear of losing face, face already lost, and guilt, with the first two dividing into a series of subordinate categories. The largest family, fear of losing face, subsumes subordinate categories that indicate physiological and psychological reactions prior to losing face, such as blushing, feeling inferior, and hushing up a scandal. The second family, face already lost, represents a person's feelings after she has lost face, as indicated by subcategories dishonored, ashamed, and embarrassed. Ashamed includes terms that reflect mild to extremely painful shame. Dishonor contains terms such as dishonor on one's face, and no place to hide from one's shame. The embarrassed subcategory reflects milder versions of shame-related emotion. The third shame-in-self category, guilt, indicates feelings of remorse or regret for shameful or inappropriate actions. Guilt subsumes no subordinate categories and is thus less differentiated than other shame-related families.

The three shame-in-other families consist of disgrace, shamelessness, and embarrassment, each of which divides into two or three subordinate categories. Disgrace refers to both loss of face and moral failure in others, which subsumes disgraceful-humiliating (public debasement) and shame to rage (intense shame producing intense anger at being shamed). Shamelessness is the second largest category of shame-related words. It is divided into three subordinate categories that indicate different ways of condemning others in shame. The first subcategory involves despising a shamed person (hate, disrespect). The second, casting disgusted voice, refers to ways of communicating with a shamed person, which include vocal and facial acts marking the other's behavior as shameful or disgusting. The final subcategory consists of condemning for lack of shame, which refers to ways of condemning others for their shamelessness. In China, shamelessness is even worse than being ashamed, as it connotes a lack of connection to the social values and moral systems that organize shame. The final shame-in-others category is embarrassment, which subsumes ways of embarrassing others and strategies to save others from embarrassment.

Shame is present in both English-language and Chinese cultures. However, in contrast to shame in English, the organization of shame-related concepts in Chinese is extremely rich. Although it may be

possible to make similar shame-related discriminations in all cultures, shame-related states and practices are relatively impoverished in English-language cultures and apparently in many other Western cultures (Shaver, Wu, & Schwartz, 1992). This difference reflects the comparatively central role that shame plays in regulating self and social behavior in China and the richly textured distinctions that Chinese people make to conceptualize, communicate, and socialize shame in self and others.

Culture and the Dynamic Construction of Pride, Shame, and Guilt

What accounts for the similarities and differences in the cultural organization of emotion in the U.S and China? Cultures are constituted in part by socially shared meaning systems that mediate ways of interpreting one's social world (Geertz, 1973; Shweder & LeVine, 1984). As children construct and internalize cultural values, meanings, and beliefs in ontogenesis, cultural meanings transform the ways in which they appraise motive-relevant aspects of their environments and regulate emotional conduct. Emotions undergo successive transformation as they are shaped toward culturally defined ideals and endpoints. To the extent that different cultures are organized around different motive-relevant values and beliefs, emotions will develop along different pathways en route to different culturally valued endpoints. To illustrate, we will examine cultural similarities and differences in the dynamic development of pride and shame in the USA and China. In so doing, we first examine the overarching individualist and Confucian belief systems that continue to frame understandings of persons, social relations, and moral values in the USA and China respectively. Thereafter, we examine similarities and differences in the organization of some of the self-evaluative emotions (pride, shame, and guilt) that arise under American individualism and Chinese Confucianism. Finally, we chart the ways in which pride- and shame-related states take different pathways as they develop toward different culturally valued endpoints.

Individualist and Confucian Cultural Frameworks

American individualism is founded upon the primacy of individuals in personal, social, moral, and civic relations. American individualism values freedom to pursue personal happiness, equality before God and the law, and individual choice in matters of social relations. In this way, Americans can be said to construct selves that are relatively bounded and separate from others (Bellah et al., 1985; Dumont, 1992; Johnson, 1985; Marcus & Kitayama, 1991; Sampson, 1988). At least in the Anglo middle class of American culture, individuals tend to make relatively clear distinctions about what to consider me and mine as opposed to you and yours. These individualist beliefs are organized around a morality based on principles of individual rights, justice, and equality (Kohlberg, 1992). Persons possess universal inalienable rights. Social relations are based upon freely negotiated contracts and agreements. Although individualist systems demand that individuals refrain from actions that bring harm to others, there are no superogatory moral

obligations to sacrifice the self on the behalf of others (Miller, 1994). With exceptions (such as relationships to one's children), individuals are not constrained strongly by a priori obligations of duty, loyalty, or service to others, whether those others include one's spouse or extended family, employer, or nation. These beliefs follow from the priority placed on both freedom to pursue individual happiness as well as freedom from arbitrary constraint (Locke, 1975/1764; Mill, 1986/1859).

Consistent with these beliefs, Americans place considerable value on individuality (Bellah et al., 1985; Johnson, 1985), independence (Emerson, 1990/1841; Raeff, 1998), and personal achievement (Maehr & Nicholls, 1980; McClelland, 1961). Persons are seen as unique individuals and are encouraged to express their personal feelings and desires and to develop their particular talents. Children are socialized to depend upon themselves rather than upon others in performing any given task. In consonance with these beliefs, Americans place considerable importance on self-esteem (Hewitt, 1997; Mecca, Smelser, & Vasconcellos, 1989), which is seen as both a determinant and product of personal achievement. Many Americans believe that in order to succeed, individuals must believe in their abilities (e.g., have self-confidence) and develop positive self-esteem. Because of the importance placed upon self-esteem, Americans praise their children's successes and protect them from shame. In this way, personal achievement is outcome- rather than process-oriented. That is, the main focus of achievement activity is on producing specific outcomes, rather than on the process of learning, developing, or achieving per se (Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Line, & Wan, 1999; Kamins & Dweck, 1999). As such, although effort and hard work are valued (e.g., as in the Protestant work ethic), they are seen as means to reaching desired ends rather than as valuable in themselves. Perhaps because of the value placed upon demonstrating one's uniqueness, individuals often attribute their successes and failures to individual ability rather than to effort or hard work (Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Nicholls, 1976).

The situation is quite different in many Asian cultures. For example, Chinese Confucian conceptions of self and social life are organized around the idea of self-perfection as a relational process (Tu, 1985). This notion is embodied by the dual assumptions that (a) individuals develop through a life-long process of self-cultivation and (b) the self is a nexus of social relationships (Tu, 1979, 1985). With regards to the first assumption, Confucianism maintains that individual development consists of a life-long process of self-cultivation and self-perfection, sometimes called the Way (Tu, 1979). Through this process, one literally learns to become human. Confucianism specifies a series of ultimate life goals (Tu, 1979; Yu, 1996; Wu, 1996). These include ren, (benevolence), yi (righteousness) and li (ritual propriety). Of these, ren is the most important, as it specifies the fundamental quality of being human. From this view, self-cultivation is a life-

long process of cultivating a moral and spiritual character – to become the most benevolent, sincere, and humane person possible.

There are several important implications of the cultivation of ren. First, self-cultivation refers to a life-long process rather than a search for a fixed and attainable outcome. In this sense, the cultivation of ren is never complete. Any concrete achievement in life is seen as but a single step or milestone in a long, long process of learning to become ren. As such, particular developmental outcomes are secondary to the Way. Second, the search for ren involves a highly disciplined search of the good life, which cannot be reached without sustained effort and lifelong devotion. The search for ren is similar to the process of becoming a mathematician (or any other type of learned scholar). Although a rudimentary sense of numeracy may exist from the start, one cannot become a great mathematician without conscious effort and cultivation. In this way, effort functions as the primary tool in developing ren because it puts desire into action (Lee, 1996; Li, 1997; Tu, 1979). Today the notion of continuous self-perfection through hard work continues to be a primary value of Chinese people (Li, 1997).

However, self-cultivation is not an individualist process. Ren, the fundamental human quality of benevolence, is an inherently social and moral value. To become sincerely benevolent and humane requires that one puts others first. This is a reflection of the primacy that Chinese Confucianism places upon social harmony within hierarchy. In Confucianism, individuals are not isolated units; they are born into a web of social relationships that are organized in terms of a richly ordered hierarchy. As such, one is inherently connected to others as part of a hierarchically structured whole. One cultivates the self through relationships with others. Development is a life-long process involving an "ever increasing awareness of the presence of the other in one's self-cultivation" (Tu, 1985, p. 232). As further articulated by Tu, "A Confucian self devoid of human-relatedness has little meaningful content of its own…A Confucian man's self-awareness of being a son, a brother, a husband, or a father dominates his awareness of himself as a self-reliant and independent person" (p. 233). To become a harmonious being within the social hierarchy, self-cultivation occurs as one willingly learns to suppress one's own desires and define oneself in terms of the needs and wishes of others within the family and broader society. To maintain social harmony, it is necessary to praise others and efface the self in social relations (Bond, Leung, & Wan, 1982; Chen, 1994; Gao, Ting-Toomey, & Gudykunst, 1996; Stipek, 1999).

The social process of self-cultivation begins in the family. The indigenous concept of filial piety (xiao qin; Ho, 1986; 1996; Tu, 1985; Yu, 1996) is central to Chinese self and socialization. Yang (1988, 1996) has demonstrated that the traditional value of filial piety continues to be represented in Chinese culture today. Filial piety refers to the strict moral obligations that exist between children and parents. Filial piety

establishes the absolute authority of parents over children and brings with it reciprocal obligations of parents to children. It specifies standards for how children relate to their parents and other family members, living or deceased. It specifies how they are to honor and respect their parents and family name (especially in the traditionally sacrosanct father-son relationship), to provide for them in old age, and to perform ceremonial rituals of worship. According to the Book of Rites, a son demonstrates his filial piety in three ways: by honoring his father, by not disgracing him, and by caring for him in old age. It is difficult to overestimate the importance and scope of filial piety in shaping Chinese selves. According to Fung (1952):\,

> If a man in his own house and privacy be not grave, he is not filial; if in serving his ruler he be not loyal, he is not filial; if in discharging the duties of office he be not serious, he is not filial; if with friends he be not sincere, he is not filial; if on the field of battle he be not brave, he is not filial. If he fail in these five things, the evil [of the disgrace] will reflect on his parents. Dare he but be serious? (p. 360, cited in Tu, 1985, p. 237-238)

It is important to note that although filial piety is often understood in terms of obligations of children to parents, it is fully mutual and reciprocal. Parents have a duty to sacrifice for and support their children throughout their lifespan. It is the parental commitment to children that provides the basis for children's filial devotion (xiao) in the first place.

The Classic of Filial Piety defines it as "raising one's reputation in order to exalt one's parents" (cited in Yu, 1996), a definition that accentuates the importance of maintaining face and familial honor (Gabrenya & Hwang, 1996; Cocroft & Ting-Toomey, 1994). Hu (1944) proposed two basic aspects of face in Chinese society and social relations. Lian refers to an individual's moral character in the eyes of others, and it develops as one exhibits faithful compliance to moral, ritual, and social norms. To say that a person bu yao lian ("doesn't want face") indicates that the person is "shameless" or "immoral" and is one of the worst insults that can be cast against a person. In China, the second aspect of face is mianzi, refers to one's reputation or social prestige. Mianzi is earned through success in life, attaining a high or respected social position. To say that a person mei you mianzi means that one is not deserving of honor or respect. Although still insulting, it is less harsh than being characterized as "shameless" (lacking lian). According to Hu (1944), although Westerners have a concept of "face" similar to mianzi (i.e. "social prestige"), it does not have the strong moral implications of the concept of lian. Face is a driving force in social relations among the Chinese, and failures to show lian or mianzi bring dishonor, disgrace, and shame to one's family, self, and other significant relationships (guanxi; Gabrenya & Hwang, 1996).

To promote the cultivation of ren, self-effacement, and self-harmonization with others, Chinese parents adopt relatively strict socialization processes. Although efforts to socialize children begin soon after

they begin to talk and walk, strict discipline increases precipitously at the "age of reason" (dongshi, around five years of age). A central value is affective control: Children are taught to control their impulses and not to reveal their thoughts and feelings. Violence is strictly forbidden and is met with severe consequences. Socialization may involve corporal punishment, which becomes unnecessary as soon as children are able to cease prohibited actions on demand (Ho, 1986; Wu, 1996). To promote filial piety, proper behavior, benevolence, and love of learning, parents draw upon a variety of shaming techniques. If, for example, a child were to show inadequate learning in school, a parent might say "Shame on you!" "You didn't practice hard enough!" "Everyone will laugh at you!" "I have no face with your teachers!" or "You show no filial piety!" Thus, the use of shaming techniques and the creation of strong emotional bonds promote the self-cultivation of relational selves (Wu, 1996; Wu & Tseng, 1985).

Cultural Organization of Self-Evaluative Emotions

Social, self-evaluative emotions exist across cultures, but their specific forms are strongly shaped by cultures (Tangney & Fischer, 1995). Figure 4 outlines the organization of social, self-evaluative emotions within the contexts of American Individualism and Chinese Confucianism. Whereas Americans tend to make sharp distinctions between the moral and the conventional (Turiel, 1983), under Confucianism all domains of human action are seen as having a strong moral component (Tu, 1979). For example, under American individualism, achievement is an important social value, but it is not considered a moral imperative or obligation. In contrast, under Confucianism obligations to family and social groups, life-long learning and self-cultivation, and physical/sexual/civic mores are all connected as part of the larger system of explicitly moral obligations to harmonize oneself with others (Tu, 1979, 1985).

American individualism: Separation of achievement and morality. Two separate routes to the experience of self-evaluative emotions within American individualism are social achievement (Atkinson, 1957; Maehr, 1974; Weiner, 1985) and moral conduct (Barrett, Cole, & Zahn-Waxler, 1992; Hoffman, 1982). Within achievement domains, if people succeed at an important task, they may become proud of the self's ability or accomplishment. Pride is a manifestation of self-esteem and is acceptable as celebration and sharing of one's worthy self and accomplishments with others. Pride becomes negative when taken to the extreme, evolving into hubris (Lewis, 1996). Conversely, upon failing in an achievement domain, people may become ashamed of their lack of ability (Stipek et al., 1993). In individualism, shame can arise from an uncontrollable flaw in the self, which is damaging to self-esteem (Lewis, 1996). As a result, shame engenders hiding, social withdrawal, and self-reproach (H. B. Lewis, 1971; M. Lewis, 1996; Tangney, 1995),

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Insert Figure 4 About Here

A second pathway to self-evaluative emotion under individualism is through moral violations. When people violate a moral norm (e.g., harm another person, violate their rights), they may experience guilt, shame, or both, depending upon their appraisal of the situation. If they focus on their responsibility for an immoral outcome, they experience guilt and attempt to fix the situation, make reparations, or confess (Hoffman, 1992; Mascolo & Fischer, 1995). If instead they view themselves from the eyes of another and see themselves as an immoral, bad, or evil person, they experience shame (Cole, Barrett, & Zahn-Waxler, 1992; Lindsay-Hartz, de Rivera, & Mascolo, 1995). In this way, in individualist systems guilt functions primarily as a moral emotion, while shame can function as either a moral emotion or an emotion of social evaluation.

Chinese Confucianism: Morality and self-harmonization. The situation is quite different under Confucianism. Instead of making a sharp distinction between the social evaluative and the moral, Confucianism treats social/familial obligations, learning, and physical/sexual mores as all primarily moral concerns (Li, 1997; Tu, 1985; Yu, 1996). Because of the value placed upon harmony within hierarchy in Chinese society (Gabrenya & Hwang, 1996), both the feeling and enactment of pride are explicitly discouraged (Stipek, 1999). If one meets one's social and familial obligations, one brings honor to the family, not pride to oneself. Similarly, in light of the Confucian ideal that individuals are not viewed as isolated from their social relations, an individual's worthy accomplishments are not attributed exclusively to the self. Instead, they are seen as products of one's relationships with family and other social groups with whom individuals identify and gain their support (Li, 1997). As such, a person who has produced a worthy outcome brings honor not primarily upon the self, but instead to his or her family and other significant social groups. Thus, when a person performs worthy action, the appropriate response is not self-celebration but instead modesty, self-effacement, and praise for the other (Bond, Leung, & Wan, 1980; Crittenden, 1991; Gao, Ting-Toomey, & Gudykunst, 1996, Li, 1997; Stipek, 1999).

The practice of modesty and self-effacement can be illustrated through an analysis of Chinese politeness strategies. In an analysis of Chinese and American responses to social compliments, Chen (1993) reported that Americans used four basic politeness strategies: accepting (39%), returning (19%), deflecting (30%), and rejecting (13%) compliments. In contrast, Chinese respondents showed three basic strategies but used primarily one: rejecting (96%), in contrast to thanking and denigrating the self (3%) and accepting the compliment (1%). For example, in response to a compliment such as "You look so nice!" a Chinese individual might say, "No, I know I don't look nice. In fact, you're the one that looks better," or perhaps "No. Don't say that. I'm embarrassed" (Chen, 1993, p. 72-73). Chen interpreted these results in terms of Leech's (1983) agreement and modesty maxims of conversation. Americans generally attempt to

maximize agreement between interlocutors, while Chinese seek primarily to promote modesty in the self and praise for the other. Similarly, in a study on Chinese conceptions of learning, Li (1997) reported that Chinese people were more likely to report modesty/calmness from learning well rather than happiness or pride.

This practice cannot simply be viewed as a kind of "false modesty" or impression management. Markus and Kitayama (1996) studied the role of culture in the organization of emotional experiences and found that while both Japanese and American participants discriminated between socially engaged versus socially disengaged feelings, the affective valence of their reactions differed greatly. Socially engaged positive feelings include being together (feelings of closeness, friendliness, respect), while socially disengaged positive emotions cast individuals apart from each other (feelings of pride, superiority, being on top of the world). For Japanese in contrast to Americans, ratings of socially engaged emotions were more strongly correlated with general positive emotions (e.g., feeling happy, relaxed, calm, or elated) (Kitayama, Markus, & Kurowkawa, 1994). Conversely, ratings of positive disengaged emotions were more strongly correlated with general positive feelings for Americans than for Japanese. That is, "feeling good" is strongly related to feelings of social engagement among the Japanese and to feelings of pride and superiority among Americans. Markus and Kitayama (1995, 1996) argue that individual attributes are important dimensions of self to Americans, but maintaining harmonious relationships is more central to Japanese sense of self. They suggest that the motivation for self-effacement among the Japanese is neither false modesty, lack of self-esteem, nor impression management, but self-harmonization – the desire to maintain a conception of self as part of a harmonious relationship with the other. We suggest that Chinese self-effacement similarly reflects genuine self-harmonization rather than false modesty.

In contrast to occasions for honor, if one does not meet one's social obligations, one brings dishonor to the family and experiences shame/guilt upon the self. Because Chinese shame incorporates a moral dimension of obligation to others, shame and guilt are not as differentiated among the Chinese as among Americans. Chinese shame/guilt is not a discrete state but comprises a melding of elements of both shame and guilt. In this affective state, people are aware of both having committed a moral wrong and having brought dishonor upon others. As such, shame/guilt brings about not only self-recrimination, a tendency to hide the self, and so forth, but also a resolve to change the self in order restore honor to the other (fix the situation). Moreover, this resolve is enacted through deeds and not simply through words (Li, 1997). In shame/guilt people may neither confess nor even seek verbal forgiveness but need to cultivate the self through correct action to assuage shame/guilt.

When people have failed to meet their obligations and duties, others will use shaming techniques (as described above), but these techniques usually proceed under the presupposition of reintegration (Braithwaite, 1989). The shamed party is aware that following the establishment of correct behavior, all will be forgiven, and he or she will be accepted back into the family or community. This is reflected in the Chinese aphorism "Gold can't be exchanged for a returned soul." It is through reintegration that shaming and shame/guilt can function to effectively regulate social behavior. Reintegration reflects the role of the parent (and society) in filial piety: Although the child has the obligation to honor the parent, the parent has the reciprocal obligation to support the child in his or her attempt to cultivate the self.

An important exception to the rule of reintegrative shaming involves transgressions against important sexual, physical, or civic codes. While Chinese parents are generally strict in their discipline practices (Ho, 1986; Wu, 1996), sanctions by parents and the larger society for major violations of the law and sexual mores are severe. For example, Vagg (1998) pointed out limits to reintegrative shaming in China, reporting evidence that for children labeled as delinquent in Hong Kong, negative sanctions are swift, severe, and stigmatizing (such as immediate expulsion from school and prosecution rather than warning upon first criminal offense). Being cast as a "delinquent" in Hong Kong carries a substantial stigma with little opportunity for reintegration into the community. Such punitive and ostracizing practices reflect stigmatizing shame in response to transgressions of moral standards that are considered inviolable.

In summary, there appear to be at least two routes to shame/guilt in China. In the primary route the affect regulates social conduct in daily social interactions, particularly within families and close social contexts, in order ultimately to integrate individuals back into society. In contrast, deintegrative shaming (Braithwaite, 1989) stigmatizes those who have acted beyond the pale by transgressing societal laws and cultural taboos, and it functions as a strong warning for others who might act similarly. Perhaps the former more reintegrative mode of shaming is central to Chinese society, while Americans tend to conceptualize shame more unidimensionally with the latter, more stigmatizing version. This interpretation may help explain why Americans tend to protect their children from shame and avoid the use of shaming techniques in socialization (Massaro, 1998).

Pathways in the Development of Self-Evaluative Emotions in the USA and China

How do self-evaluative emotions develop in directions defined by different cultural ideals? In this section, we examine similarities and differences in the development of pride- and shame-related emotions in the USA and China. Drawing upon available evidence, we use dynamic skill theory as a framework to analyze the ways in which self-evaluative emotions develop along different pathways in the USA and China.

Dynamic Skill Theory as a Framework for Analyzing Pathways in Emotional Development

Dynamic skill theory provides a set of conceptual and methodological tools for predicting and assessing transformations in dynamic structures of action, thought, and feeling. The central unit in dynamic skill theory is the skill – a capacity to organize actions, thoughts, and feelings within a given context for a specific goal or task. For predicting developmental pathways, dynamic skill theory defines a developmental scale and a series of rules and methods for using it to analyze developing actions, thoughts, and feelings. The scale consists of 13 developmental levels in the capacity to organize skills, which are grouped into four tiers from birth through adulthood. In the first tier, consist of innate action elements, such as looking at an object placed in front of the face reflexes, and come under control initially at around 1 month of age . Beginning around 4 months of age, children gain the capacity to coordinate systems of action elements (reflexes) into sensorimotor actions, which consist of flexible and controlled actions (relatively independent of postural constraints) on objects, such as controlled tracking of an object moving in front of an infant. Beginning around 18 to 24 months of age, children begin to coordinate multiple sensorimotor systems into concrete representations. Using representations, a child can make one action sequence evoke or stand for an absent action or meaning, such as using the movement of a doll to stand for and evoke the action of walking. Finally, beginning around 10 to 11 years of age, children begin to construct abstractions consisting of generalized and intangible meaning structures, such as abstract and generalized representations of self, pride, and shame.

Within each tier, skills pass through four levels (single sets, mappings, systems, and systems of systems). Through a careful analysis of the ways in which specific sets of skill elements are coordinated within any given task and social context, skill theory allows fine-grained specification of an indefinite number of intermediate steps between any two consecutive levels. Each tier, level, and step in development emerges gradually as a result of the hierarchical coordination and differentiation of lower-level skills into higher-order structures within a given context. Unlike stages in theories such as Piaget's, developing structures do not reflect generic levels of competence, but instead skills develop within particular tasks, conceptual and emotional domains, and social contexts. The level of skill evinced by a particular child in any given context at a specific moment varies as a function of a wide variety of variables. For example, an individual's level of skill can vary as a result of the amount of support provided by the social context. Studies demonstrate, for example, that children function at higher levels in contexts that provide high levels of support for complex activity than in contexts that provide less social support (Fischer, Rotenberg, Bullock, & Raya, 1993; Fogel, 1993; Rogoff, 1993; Vygotsky, 1978). Similarly, an individual's skill level varies as a

function of the task being performed, the conceptual or emotional domain in question, the temperament or affective state of the individual, and a suite of additional variables.

There are two important implications of these principles. First, it is not helpful to locate the developmental level of a person's skills at a single point on a ladder; instead, a person's skills occupy a range of different possible points within a given developmental pathway. Second, as illustrated in Figure 5, development is like a web, not a ladder (Bidell & Fischer, 1992; Fischer & Bidell, 1998). Whereas a ladder represents development in terms of a single unidirectional sequence of steps, a web represents development in terms of alternative and interconnected pathways, each with potentially different starting and ending points. For example, skills for constructing pride-relevant appraisals and actions may develop along different pathways than skills for constructing shame-relevant appraisals. Similarly, for any given skill domain (such as shame or pride) different individuals may take different pathways in the development of the same skill domain. Factors that mediate these differences include temperament, personal history, culture, and a range of other processes. In what follows, we use dynamic skill theory to analyze alternative pathways in development of pride- and shame-relevant emotions that result from different cultural beliefs, values, and practices.

Insert Figure 5 About Here

Pathways in the Development of Emotional Reactions to Accomplishment

Whereas accomplishment in the USA typically leads to the experience of pride, the parallel emotions among the Chinese might be described as self-harmonization or social honor. Alternative developmental pathways in the development of pride and self-harmonization/social honor are depicted in Table 2. It is likely that both cultural pathways build upon the biologically canalized capacity for experiencing joy in the context of self-produced outcomes. Such reactions can be observed as early as 6 weeks of age. For example, Watson and Ramey (1972) demonstrated that within days of exposure to mobiles activated by subtle head movements, eight week olds infants smiled as their actions resulted in movements of the mobiles (see also Lewis et al., 1990). In terms of dynamic skill theory, such reactions are mediated by the capacity of young infants to construct reflex mappings – the coordination of two simple reflexes or action elements. In this case, an infant is able to experience pleasure upon actively coordinating moving the head with seeing a resulting effect (the shaking mobile). Beyond this point, the American and Chinese emotional pathways begin to diverge, with biases toward one pattern or the other. In the USA, pride undergoes development in the direction of increasingly complex representations of the self as competent, valuable, or capable of producing socially worthy outcomes. American parents often direct children's attention to themselves and their own worthy accomplishments. Parents encourage children to feel good about their own

achievements and about their role in bringing about valued outcomes. Of course, some of these patterns occur in Chinese families too, but the bias is toward the alternative pathway of self-harmonization.

Insert Table 2 About Here

Throughout the first year of life, American children are able to detect increasingly complex action-outcome contingencies. For example, at Step P2, with the onset of sensorimotor systems around 11 to 13 months of age, infants experience joy over complex action-outcome contingencies that involve a sensorimotor awareness of the evaluations of others. At this step, a child coordinates grasping and arm movements to achieve the goal of throwing an object and seeing and hearing the verbal and gestural praise of others. Upon success, children at this age often smile and reference their parent (Mascolo & Harkins, 1998). At Step P3, with the emergence of single representations at around 20 months of age, children develop a more sophisticated sense of joy/pride of self as an agent of outcomes. This step corresponds with the development of the onset of strong self-recognition and the ability to represent simple outcome standards (Pipp, Fischer, & Jennings, 1987). At this step, a child represents herself as an agent who caused an outcome and so can make appraisals such as “I did it!” or a non-verbal equivalent. Children’s emotional reactions to self-caused actions change around this age. Heckhausen (1987; J. Heckhausen, 1988) has reported that beginning around 14 to 20 months, children stop and notice results of their acts. Lutkenhaus (1984) suggests that this occurs when children focus on outcomes per se rather than on the flow of activity. Kagan (1981) reported that smiles on completion of goal-directed acts increased between 20 and 24 months, around the same time children show full self-recognition (Bertenthal & Fischer, 1978; Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1978; Pipp, Fischer, & Jennings, 1987) and distress after inability to imitate modeled acts.

Beginning around 2½ years of age, as children gain the capacity to construct increasingly complex single representations, pride of self as a competent agent (Step P4) begins to emerge. At this step, a child not only constructs an awareness that he or she performed an outcome, but also that the outcome is valued and/or that the self is competent (e.g. “I’m good at it!”). Several studies suggest that between about 2 1/2 and 3 years of age, children begin to evaluate themselves positively in the context of achievement. Lewis, Allesdandri, and Sullivan (1992) reported such a reaction in 3-year-olds in basketball toss and drawing tasks. Halisch and Halisch (1980, cited in Heckhausen, 1984) reported pride-like reactions in 2½ year olds in a ring stacking task. Only indirect evidence suggests that such reactions are mediated by a sense of competence (Geppert & Kuster, 1983). At Step P5, pride over comparative performance, emerging with the onset of representational mappings around 3 or 3½ years of age, a child compares her performance with that of others in a given context. Such comparisons can take place in a variety of contexts, including competition (winning or losing in a competitive task or game) or identification (comparing one’s performance

with that of a valued other). In studies employing competitive ring stacking, for example, Stipek, Recchia, and McClintic (1992) reported that although children older than 32 months smiled more after winning than losing at competitive ball stacking, only 3½ year olds appreciated competition as shown by pausing, slowing down, or stopping after losing.

There are fewer empirical studies related to the development of pride in middle childhood and adolescence. With the onset of representational systems, children can control the relation between two representational mappings. At Step P5, using representational systems a child coordinates multiple representations of successful outcomes and parental positive evaluations of those outcomes to feel proud of a valued concrete trait. For example, generalizing across different contexts, a child constructs an appraisal such as "Mom and Dad are happy with me because I do well at soccer and baseball. I'm good at sports!" With the onset of single abstractions at around 10 to 11 years of age, children construct abstractions for generalized and intangible aspects of their valued self-identity, such as feeling proud of generalized personality characteristics. Generalizing across multiple positively evaluated concrete outcomes in sports and academics, a young adolescent makes the generalized appraisal that "I'm a competent person!"

Pride-related appraisals continue to develop within the tier of abstractions and well into adulthood (Fischer, Yan, & Stewart, in press). For example, consider the actual experience of Todd Duncan, an African-American who retrospectively expressed his pride upon having seen African-American soprano Marian Anderson sing at the Lincoln Memorial after she was denied the opportunity to sing at Constitution Hall in 1939. "My feelings were so deep…It was the same feeling I had…when we heard that 'I Have a Dream' speech. Number one, I never have been so proud to be an American. Number two, I've never been so proud to be an American Negro. Number three, I've never had such pride in seeing this Negro woman stand up there with this great royal dignity and sing" (James, 1991). At the very least, as indicated in Step P8, this self-reflective appraisal operates at the level of abstract mappings, which allow coordination of the relation between two abstractions. In identifying with Ms. Anderson and her achievement, Mr. Duncan related his own generalized racial identity to the symbolic significance of Ms. Anderson's performance for the status of African-Americans in American society.

Emotional reactions to accomplishment follow a different pathway among the Chinese that is consistent with a Confucian cultural framework. With development, accomplishment-related appraisals increasingly incorporate representations of the impact of one's positive actions on the other. Whereas steps in the development of American pride are often analyzed most effectively for dyads, self-harmonization and social honor develop among the Chinese within triadic and larger interactions involving the child, a parent, and other relatives or members of significant social groups. When a child performs an action that meets

social obligations and expectations, parents will acknowledge the success, but without the effusive praise that is often exhibited by American parents (Heckhausen, 1987; Mascolo & Harkins, 1998; Reissland, 1994). In addition, parents generally make self-effacing comments to others about the child and his or her accomplishment (e.g., "She just barely made it through the song!" "He did alright, but he needs to practice more"). In a display of social honor, relatives and guests who observe the child's worthy behavior will offer effusive praise of both the child and the parent. In this way, the discrepancy between a parent's child-effacing remarks and a third party's effusive praise set the stage for the development of a child's proclivity to honor others in modest self-harmonization in contexts involving the self's accomplishments.

This socialization process begins in the first years of life. Step S/H2, joy over action-outcome sequence, is similar to pride in American children. However, instead of praising a child-chosen goal, parents often induce children to perform social goals chosen by parents, by for example beginning to socialize sharing in the first year. A parent might coax her child, for example, to share candy with Grandma. To encourage success, a parent will praise the child, albeit with less effusiveness than American parents. Using complex sensorimotor systems, an 12-month-old coordinates reaching and opening the hand to yield the candy and connect these actions to the mother's ongoing request and her subsequent smile and praise. Thus, richly textured social interactions orient children's actions and feelings toward others even in infancy.

S/H3, joy/pride of self as agent of socially induced outcomes, is also comparable to pride among American children at this level, except that a child represents his or her role in complying with a parental request (e.g., share candy with Grandma) instead of a personally chosen goal. In this way, at the level of single representations, a Chinese child might make an appraisal like "I give candy to Grandma" or "I did what momma wanted." Again, a parent would likely acknowledge the outcome ("that's nice" or "good job") but without effusive affect. Step S/H4, quiet pride in meeting continued expectations, begins to diverge from pride among American children. It is customary in Chinese culture for children to display skills that they learn in school to relatives and guests. Within such a context, Chinese families begin the process of triangulating the child's accomplishments, social praise, and child-effacement. Upon demonstrating a worthy skill (such as singing a song learned in school), a relative might offer effusive praise to both child and parent. The parent will acknowledge the child's accomplishment by saying "*hai-hao*" (meaning "okay" or something similar), which recognizes the positive outcome but implies that the child should continue his positive efforts and play down his accomplishment. Moreover, the parent effaces the child in front of the relative ("He did all right, but he has to learn the song better!"). As a result, children construct appraisals such as "I have to keep going," which reflect an incipient sense that one has succeeded but must continue to work hard and improve; and they begin to show restraint in exhibiting self-celebratory actions upon success.

With development, children differentiate further the need for modesty in accomplishment. At Step S/H5, modesty in accomplishment, they use representational mappings to coordinate a triangulated representation of the social meanings of success. For example, a child represents the relations among her mother's effacement (hai-hao), a relative's praise of the self, and the child's own need to continue to work hard to bring about positive outcomes. A child might make an appraisal like "Mom's friend is happy with my singing, but Mom wants me to keep working hard." In so doing, the child is beginning to represent the need for modesty and continued effort in the context of concrete positive outcomes. At Step S/H6, concrete effacing honor, these appraisal elements become more explicit and inter-coordinated. At this level, a child represents the complex relations between (a) his mother's expectations of piety (ting-hua, which means "listen to my words") and continued hard work (hai-hao), (b) his teachers praiseful honoring of mother and self, and (c) his own need to continue to be modest (quiet) and try hard in learning. To highlight the role of multiple others in the child's experience, we have represented this level in terms of a compounded representational system, which is more complex (and would develop later) than the corresponding structure provided for American pride at this level.

The final steps represent continued development of self-harmonizing social honor. At Step S/H7, a young adolescent begins to coordinate two representational systems into a single abstraction of self-effacing social honor. At this level, a young adolescent enacts modesty in bestowing honor upon his parents. Such an appraisal is reflected in a child's ability to connect different aspects of his positive effort to his mother's desire for continued hard work, as well as others' praise for his parents and self. In so doing, a child makes an abstract appraisal such as "My achievement can't be apart from my parents" (Li, 1997) or "I have brought honor to my parents." Finally, at Step S/H8 and the level of abstract mappings, an older adolescent or young adult begins to further differentiate her role in bestowing honor to her family – for example, making an abstract appraisal such as "I must continue to show positive effort in all that I do in order to bring mianzi (social honor) and lian (moral adulation) to my family/school/country."

Development of Chinese Shame/Guilt

Our developmental analysis of shame/guilt begins with the important differences between China and the USA in the organization, function, and socialization of shame. First, shame and shaming play central roles in Chinese socialization, whereas American parents often work to protect their children from shame. Second, Chinese shame arises when individuals have violated their duties and obligations in the eyes of significant others. As such, shame is often mixed with guilt (Li, 1997; Wang, 1994). Third, whereas shame in the USA carries stigmatizing connotations, shame/guilt among the Chinese offers the promise of reintegration into the family or community following reestablishment of appropriate behavior. As such,

shame is not primarily a threat to self-esteem, but instead it is a vehicle for social cohesion and the development of self. For these reasons, shame develops along different pathways in China and the USA.

Table 3 provides a description of developmental changes in the organization and socialization of Chinese shame/guilt. We suggest that important precursors to shame (in both the USA and China) occur within the first year of life in the form of affective misattunements between infants and caregivers (Shore, 1998; Nathanson, 1987; Tomkins, 1987, 1990). Over the first months of life, infants and their caregivers develop increasingly sophisticated ways of anticipating and co-regulating each other's actions and emotions (Trevarthen, 1993; Trevarthen & Hubley, 1978). Disruptions of such mutually established affective routines and expectations can result in negative emotions in the infant (Tronick, 1989). For example, using sensorimotor mappings, a child coordinates two actions into a single skill (such as looking at mother for a smile and seeing her frown). In the context of a simple social game such as peekaboo, an infant who has come to expect a smile from her caregiver may react with distress and gaze aversion if her turn in the game were met with a frown or some other negative emotional expression. Although some theorists suggest that such infant experiences reflect shame per se, we believe that young infants are not yet able to construct reflective representations of self in the eyes of others. Such emotional reactions are best interpreted as early precursors of shame.

Insert Table 3 About Here

At Step S/G2, using sensorimotor systems, a child responds with social distress in interpersonal contexts involving negative caregiver reactions to violations of explicit requests. For example, a parent might respond to a child who refused to share her candy with Grandma by saying with a sad voice and expression, "Aiya, Lin won't share her candy," or "I have a child who won't share with Grandma." At the level of sensorimotor systems, a child connects seeing and hearing his mother's voice and facial expressions to his unwillingness to extend his hand and give grandma some candy. At this level, a child deflects his gaze away from others in social distress. Step S/G3, self-conscious social distress, arises at the level of single representations (18 to 24 months of age). At this step, a child attributes responsibility to the self-as-agent for an act that brings about explicit social disapproval. For example, alternating looking at mother and grandma, a child connects his mother's coaxing and her negative reactions to his awareness that he continues to grasp his candy, constructing a single self-conscious appraisal such as "I no give to Grandma" or "Mommy mad I no give to Grandma." Given his self-conscious awareness of his mother's negative reaction, at this level, a child may perform a variety of shame- and guilt-relevant behaviors, including gaze aversion, hiding, crying, displays of distress, or complying with the request at hand (sharing the candy).

Step S/G4, shame over negative characterization of social self, arises with the capacity to construct more complex single representations. At this step, a child attributes responsibility to self for performing or failing to perform a wanted action and also represents the value of such an act by using a single concrete social category. For example, a parent of a child who fails to share with Grandma might respond with "Be filially pious with grandma!" or "People will laugh at you if you don't share!" or "I am a mother of a child who is *buguai*." (*Buguai* can be translated as "not cute," a term similar to "naughty" that conveys mild to moderate disapproval.) These shaming statements function to orient the child's attention to the nature of the child's concrete social obligations to others and the evaluations that others will make of both the self and the mother if the child does not comply. Using a complex single representation, a child begins to represent the socially oriented evaluative aspects of his or her action, making an appraisal such as "Grandma thinks I am buguai" or "Auntie will laugh at me." Because the child is able to represent the self in terms of violations of concrete social and moral standards, this step reflects a transition to a state we would call shame/guilt per se rather than simply social distress.

With development, representations of how one's actions affect the social evaluation (face) of significant others are increasingly represented in children's shame/guilt experiences. At Step S/G5, using representational mappings, a child forms a more differentiated awareness of the relation between the self's action and the other's social evaluation (concrete relational shame). For example, a child who is unable to remember a song that she was asked to sing in front of guests can not only use social standards to evaluate the self, but can also represent the concrete social implications of her actions for her mother. For example, a child constructs a representation that "I made mother embarrassed because I didn't try hard enough on the song."

At this point, a triangulation of evaluation similar to that encountered in the development of self-harmonization begins to occur. When a child is asked to demonstrate her learning to others, a parent might first communicate the importance of correct performance to the child ("Be sure to sing 'twinkle, twinkle,' not 'tinkle tinkle'"). If the child shows poor learning, parents will efface the child's performance in front of both the child and the relative ("Lin didn't practice hard enough to learn the song!"). In contrast, the relative or guest will praise the child while effacing his or her own child ("No, she did well! She did better than my child!"). This triangulation serves important social functions. The parent's shaming communicates to the child the necessity to persevere in order to avoid public humiliation; the guest's praise offers the promise of social acceptance (reintegration) as a result of proper action on the part of the child. The actions of both parents and significant others communicate the importance of self-effacement to the child. They serve to keep the child on track of the ultimate life goal: lifelong learning toward self-perfection through self-effort.

Like American children, Chinese children are concerned with social comparisons (Cheng, 1998). For example, using representational mappings, a child can compare his performance to that of a friend and conclude: "Han drew a better picture than I did!" However, in contrast to many American parents, a Chinese parent might call attention to her child's comparatively poor performance: "Of course Han did better! He practiced harder!" Such shaming techniques communicate the importance of effort and hard work in order to please their parents. With additional development at the level of representational mappings, a child exhibits concrete comparative shame (S/G6), representing not only the relation between his performance and that of another, but also his parent's admonishment to persevere: "Mother is embarrassed that Han practiced harder than I did."

Beginning around 6 to 7 years with the capacity to coordinate two representational mappings into a representational system, children begin to experience a more concrete internalized shame (Step S/G7). At the level of representational systems, children represent in a coordinated way all the major concrete components of social shame. For the first time, a child represents not only how a specific self-caused outcome results in an unwanted concrete identity, but also the ways in which this identity results from specific failed social expectations which bring dishonor to specific significant others. As a result, a child makes a coordinated appraisal like: "By not studying enough in math, I have shown that I am a disobedient son. I have displeased my mother and embarrassed her in front of my teacher." The capacity to construct integrated shame appraisals is supported by increases in the intensity of parental shaming practices that accompany the "age of reason" (dongshi) in China (5 to 7 years) (Wu, 1996). For example, after a child exhibits poor learning in front of guests, parents use a variety of shaming techniques. For example, a parent might scratch her face in shame (i.e., placing the index finger on the upper check and brushing it downward toward the child) and say things such as "Shame on you!" "You did not practice hard enough!" "If you don't study harder, people will laugh at you!" At this step, in addition to immediate indicators of shame (such as looking away, remaining quiet), children can resolve to change their behavior to uphold concrete standards of piety (spend more time studying, show good learning in math) and please parents.

Beginning around 10 to 11 years, with the capacity to coordinate two representational systems into a single abstraction, children develop skills to construct abstractions of generalized dishonor (Step S/G8). For example, a child coordinates a representational system for concrete social shame in relation to one's mother with another such shameful representation in relation to one's father to form a single generalized abstraction: "I have brought dishonor upon my parents." In displaying poor learning, a young adolescent abstracts across specific concrete instances of his failed filial piety ("I lack piety because I showed poor learning in math," "I feel worthless because I didn't practice enough on my writing") and how it violates

social standards, causing lack of face in the parents ("Mother and father say I show no hao-xue-xin [Chinese 'heart and mind for wanting to learn] and therefore have no face in front of my teacher or with grandma and grandpa"). At this level, a shamed adolescent can resolve to put forth effort to cultivate the self by developing important character traits (such as hao-xue-xin) that would please and honor parents. (See Li, 1997, and Mascolo, Li, Fink, & Fischer, in press, for an elaboration of the Chinese concept of hao-xue-xin.)

With further development, individuals develop a generalized sense of their role in producing familial shame (abstract relational shame, Step S/G9). Beginning around 15 to 16 years of age, with the onset of the capacity to connect two abstractions into an abstract mapping, they represent the ways that their failure to show a valued generalized character trait brings social dishonor on the family. For example, a middle adolescent represents the ways that her failure to show hao-xue-xin has brought dishonor not simply to specific individuals (such as mother and father) but to the entire family or family name. In such circumstances, the shamed individual is likely to approach parents to express shame and intention to change behavior. A middle adolescent or young adult might offer a declaration to model his or her behavior on honorable figures, weep, or even in certain ritualized circumstances, kneel before parents and swear to cultivate oneself through changed behavior.

With further development, adults begin to construct increasingly coordinated appraisals reflective of the ways that multiple aspects of their failed social identity bring dishonor to increasingly generalized social others. Beginning around 19 to 20 years of age, with the capacity to coordinate two abstract mappings into a higher-order abstract system, individuals may experience generalized social shame (Step S/G10). For example, a young adult reflects upon the ways in which different aspects of his or her failed social identity bring social dishonor to multiple generalized social groups, such as one's family, place of employment, or nation – for example, if a national athletic team were to lose at an international competition. At this level, a member of the losing team represents the ways the team's failure to gain mianzi (social prestige, in light of the team's failure to achieve a high level of performance in the eyes of the public) and lian (everyday moral duty, as indicated by failing to play honorably or prepare hard enough) brings dishonor to family and nation as a whole. Such shameful experiences might involve affect-laden public declarations of shame, public apologies, public weeping, and both public and private declarations of one's intention to change one's unworthy actions and identity (such as writing letters to family, public officials, etc.).

Appraisals that mediate shame/guilt are organized around one's role in bringing dishonor to significant others and social groups. Developmental transformations in shame/guilt are defined by the increasing participation of one's duty to others in defining the self. Chinese parents and socialization agents use shaming techniques to promote the development of shame/guilt. Although such techniques induce

shame, they do so with the promise of social reintegration upon reestablishment of correct behavior and the presupposition that parents will support attempts to cultivate the self. This reintegration implication stands in contrast to the sense of shame as normally understood in the United States, which is organized around awareness of the self's unwanted identity as seen through the eyes of others. In the USA, shame is often seen as a stigmatizing emotion that is debilitating to an individual's self-esteem. However, with the exception of shaming that results from civic or sexual violations, debilitating shame is not the usual case among the Chinese. In Chinese cultures, persons are socialized to harmonize the self with others and to assume their proper role within the hierarchies of family and society (Ho, 1996; Wu, 1996). The establishment of a worthy independent self is not a primary concern. As such, self-esteem is not a salient motivational issue (Hewitt, 1997). One is not so much motivated to "feel good about one's independent self" as one is to harmonize one's self with others (see Markus & Kitayama, 1995, 1998). As such, shame/guilt functions to regulate social action and bring about social cohesion without serious threats to individual "self-esteem."

Towards an Integrative Account of Emotional Development

We have examined pathways in the development of pride- and shame-related emotions in the USA and China, focusing mainly upon changes in appraisal and action components of these states. Our analysis illustrates how components of emotions come together to produce similarities and differences in the ways that systems interact to produce different dynamic emotional pathways in development. It demonstrates how to use a dynamic component systems approach to analyze specific developmental pathways.

What are the appropriate roles of appraisal, action, and phenomenal experience in a theory of emotional development? How can we understand the contributions of culture, social interaction, individual activity, and biology to the development of emotions? Although we have focused on the roles of appraisal, action, and culture in emotion, our approach to emotional development cannot be regarded as either a cognitive or a cultural one. Instead, in a dynamic component systems approach, no single component system is primary in the constitution of an emotional state. Emotional states are defined in terms of the coordination of appraisal, affect, and action systems as they mutually regulate each other both within and between persons. Emotional experiences self-organize into a series of different relatively stable forms that nonetheless exhibit a large number of dynamic variations. It follows that there is no single or fixed plan for the organization of any given class of emotion, but they are modal patterns or prototypes (attractors in dynamic systems terms) that define common patterns. Emotions are constituted by processes that occur among component systems rather than as a function of any particular component system itself.

Emotions undergo developmental transformations as a result of interactions that occur among component systems that operate at a variety of hierarchical levels. At the level of individual experience and activity, emotions consist of appraisal-affect-action coordinations. Simultaneously, emotions are embodied in a series of relatively distinct and biologically canalized emotion systems in the brain and viscera. At the level of social interaction, emotions are jointly constructed as individuals adjust their component systems to the ongoing and anticipated actions of their social partners. At the level of culture, emotions are transformed by cultural meanings, values, and practices that frame, constrain, and help organize lower-order biological, individual, and dyadic activity. Thus, emotions develop as a result of interactions that occur between and among biological, personal, and sociocultural systems instead of as a result of any one of these categories of processes in isolation.

For example, the developmental pathways for pride and shame build upon partially distinct biological systems, presumably behavioral approach systems for pride and behavioral avoidance systems for shame (Gray, 1994). At the same time, the development and functioning of biological systems themselves are not sufficient to account for the emotional changes that we described. At the level of individual activity and experience, pride and shame are organized psychologically by the need to construct a worthy sense of self within one's local social and cultural group. The self-representations that mediate such experiences are not constructed by isolated individuals, but by people in social interactions that vary as a function of social context and culture. For example, in American dyads, pride experiences develop as socialization agents praise children's accomplishments; shame experiences develop in social contexts where children are made aware of their flawed identities. In contrast, in China, modest self-harmonization develops as parents efface their children's accomplishments, while relatives and other significant others praise them; shame is a normative emotion that develops as parents use explicit shaming techniques to socialize filial piety in children. Variations in the social interactions are embedded in larger cultural meaning systems, including American individualism and Chinese Confucianism.

Although we have highlighted the contributions of culture to the development of emotion, it follows from a dynamic component systems view that individuals are not simply subject to their social and cultural contexts. We are active participants in the process of our own emotional development (Fischer & Bidell, 1998; Mascolo, Pollack, & Fischer, 1997). There are bound to be differences between individuals, even within cultures, in the pathways that emotions take in their development. Our pathways merely represent predicted general trends across the two cultures and should not be taken as a precise account of development for all people in the USA and China. Although the foregoing analysis is predicated upon the notion that meaningful cultural differences exist between the USA and China, neither culture is monolithic.

Collectivist concerns and modes of relating often occur in Western society, and individualist concerns occur in Chinese culture (see Raeff, 1998). For example, shame-based codes and honor moralities have figured prominently in American culture and history, with prominent examples in the South (Cohen, Vandello, & Rantilla, 1998), under colonial Puritanism (Hawthorne, 1840/1994), and in the practice of 18th century dueling (such as the fatal duel between political leaders Alexander Hamilton and Aaron Burr). Conversely, Chinese individuals are capable of experiencing typically Western emotions such as pride and guilt, and they practice non-integrative shaming in response to legal violations and sexual taboos (Vagg, 1998); and more individualist emotions may be increasing in modern China, as they have in the modern USA.

Dynamic component systems theory offers an integrative approach for understanding emotion and its development. Like differential emotions theory (Ackerman, Abe, & Izard, 1998; Izard, 1991) and other biologically oriented approaches (Panksepp, Douglas, & Pruitt, 1998) it supports the usefulness of analyzing distinct yet interacting affective and cognitive subsystems. Emotions cannot be understood in terms of any given component system in isolation without violating key concepts of the theory. First, emotions consist of intentional states – that is, emotions are about something (Solomon, 1976) – and therefore appraisal processes are an important element not simply in the generation of intentions but also in their very constitution (Solomon, 1998). Second, while differential emotions theory maintains that distinct affective and cognitive systems interact, their interaction is limited to invariant feelings becoming attached to changing cognitive structures (Ackerman, Abe, & Izard, 1998). The concept of mutual regulation of component systems implies that affect, appraisal, and other systems modulate each other. Affect does not simply organize appraisal, but appraisal also organizes affect. Within any given category of emotions, subtle differences in appraisal and action promote subtle differences in feeling tone and phenomenal experience, so that, for example, American pride “feels” different from Chinese self-harmonization.

A dynamic component systems approach draws upon appraisal (Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 1984) and functionalist approaches to emotion as well (Barrett, 1998; Campos, 1994; Frijda & Mesquita, 1998). It embraces the idea that emotional experiences consist of multi-component processes, and it extends functionalist approaches by invoking dynamic concepts such as self-organization and mutual regulation to explain the processes by which emotional syndromes arise and take shape (see Camras, 1995). Further, unlike some versions of functionalist theory (Barrett, 1998), this view embraces the analysis of developmental transformations or levels in the organization of emotional experiences (see also Sroufe, 1996).

Finally, a dynamic component systems approach draws upon social process (Fogel et al., 1991; Dickson, Messinger, & Fogel, 1998) and social constructionist models (Harré, 1996; Lutz, 1988) of emotion.

Like social process theory, this approach holds that any emotional experience arises on-line in co-regulated interactions that occur between people. Like social constructionist approaches, it maintains that as children develop the capacity to represent and reconstruct cultural meanings from their social interactions, their appraisals and actions that compose emotional experiences undergo developmental change. With increased development, emotional experiences develop in the direction of culturally valued ideals. However, unlike social constructionist approaches, emotional experiences cannot be seen as only social or cultural constructions. Emotional experience emerges not only as a product of processes that occur between people, but also as a result of coactions that occur within individuals, including biologically canalized emotion systems.

From a dynamic component systems view, it is a mistake to view biology and culture as independent forces. Instead, they work together and are inseparable as causal processes in emotional development (Fischer & Bidell, 1998; Fischer et al., 1998; Mascolo, Pollack, & Fischer, 1997). Only by building frameworks and methods that include the multiple processes which produce emotions and emotional development can scientists go beyond simplistic approaches to build a deep understanding of human activity and experience.

Footnote

[1]The concept of emotional state reflects a “third person” perspective on an individual’s emotion. That is, it refers to the patterning of those motive-relevant physiological, psychological, and interpersonal changes that are observable (such as statements, facial expressions, actions) or potentially observable (such as with instruments to record physiological changes) to others, independent of whether they are accessible by the emoting individual herself. The concept of emotional experience reflects a first person point of view – the subjective or phenomenal aspects of component systems as they function in the context of a motive-relevant event (see Kagan, 1994; Mascolo & Harkins, 1998).

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Table 1
Anatomy of Some Emotional Syndromes in North American and Western European Culture

	Appraisal	**Phenomenal Tone**	**Action-Tendency**	***Personal* and *Social* Functions**
Joy	Motive-consistent event; getting what is wanted.	Feeling joyful qualia, excitement.	Approach others and/or wanted outcome or event	***Personal***: Alerts self of salient goal-attainment; motivates continued goal-directed activity ***Social***: Alerts others of goal attainment; brings self and others into closer proximity.
Anger	Events are illegitimate or contrary to the way they should be; other is blame-worthy and held responsible for violation.	Feeling "pressure," "heat," "tension," increase in will or resolve to move against offender; "angry" qualia.	Actions to remove violation to what ought to be (as manifested in "angry" facial and vocal expressions, verbal or nonverbal threat or attack, etc.)	***Personal***: Remove violations to one's sense of what ought to be; ***Social***: Alert others that they have violated conditions that self perceives ought to exist.
Sadness	Loss of desired object; loss of wanted state	Absence of will or resolve to change situation; lethargy; sad qualia.	Withdrawal from wanted event, activity, or social relations; motivates reflection on lost object and goal abandonment.	***Personal***: Makes self aware of loss; facilitates goal abandonment. ***Social***: Alert others of self's sense of loss; others can assist self in managing loss.
Pride	I am responsible for performing a socially valued action/being a valued person	Feeling bigger, taller, "expanding," "on top of the world", positive and excited feeling tone.	Celebrate the self; show worthy action or self to others (as manifested in *smiling*, *celebratory gestures*, *social referencing*)	***Personal***: Strengthens sense of personal worth, efficacy, and values in the eyes of others. ***Social***: Alerts others of self's accomplishment and value.
Guilt	I am responsible for a wrongdoing	Feeling "heavy," "as if I am bad."	Fix wrongdoing; confess; apologize; make reparations to others; increases resolve to act in a moral fashion; atone for sins.	***Personal***: Enhances self's sense of morality; motivates moral action; enables self to maintain moral agency and identity ("I am moral but I did a bad thing.") ***Social***: Regulate individual action in terms of social standards or appropriate *moral* conduct; helps restore interpersonal relations following transgressions.
Shame	I see myself through the eyes of others and realized that I am an unworthy person and cannot be otherwise in their eyes	Feeling "small"' feeling that one's unworthy self exposed.	Hide the self; remove the self from social scrutiny (as manifested in *gaze aversion*, *hiding the body, face, or entire self, slumped posture*, etc.)	***Personal***: Alerts self of diminished global identity in the eyes of others; motivates attempts to re-establish positive global identity. ***Social***: Regulates individual action and construction of identity in terms of socially acceptable standards of *worth* and *value*.

Table 2

Development of Pride (U.S.) and Self-Harmonization/Social Honor (China)

PRIDE (USA)		SELF-HARMONIZATION/SOCIAL HONOR (CHINA)	
Step and Description	**Developmental Level and Appraisal Skill Structure**	**Step and Description**	**Developmental Level and Appraisal Skill Structure**
P2: Joy over complex action–outcome contingency including other's evaluation. Child connects action(s) to a shared goal-related positive outcome (e.g., throwing a block) and is aware of parent's smile and positive vocalizations (11-13 months).	**Sm3: SENSORIMOTOR SYSTEMS** grasp ACT ↔ let go GOAL ↔ see smile MOM move arm / see block fly / hear voice	**S/H2: Joy over action-outcome sequence involving other's goal and evaluation**. Child performs action to conform to parent's explicitly induced goal (e.g., give food to Grandma) and connects outcome to parent's smile and vocalizations. (11-13 months).	let go ACT ↔ give candy MOM ↔ see smile MOM move arm / smile / hear voice
P3: Joy/proud of self as agent of outcome. Child carries out action with goal-directed positive results and attributes outcome to the self. A child may throw a ball and notice the parent's smile, voice, statements & gestures (applause, "good throw!"). Child makes appraisal like "I throw!" Action tendency includes self-celebration: Child looks at other, smiles, and evaluates self positively (e.g., claps, says "I did it!") (18-24 months).	**Sm4/Rp1: SINGLE REPRESENTATIONS** grasp ACT ↔ let go GOAL ↔ seen MOM move arm / see ball fly / heard ⇕ own body SEE ↔ "I" SAY ↔ "I" HEAR act / "act" / "act" ≡ *SELF* *result +*	**S/H3: Joy/proud of self as agent of socially induced outcome**. Child carries out action that conforms to parent's explicitly stated goal, connects outcome to parental evaluation and attributes it to the self. Child makes appraisal like "I give to Grandma!" Action tendency includes self-evaluation (I did it!). Parent and Grandma give modest non-effusive praise to the child; relatives offer exuberant praise.	let go ACT ↔ give candy M's GOAL ↔ seen MOM move arm / G'ma eat / heard ⇕ own body SEE ↔ "I" SAY ↔ "I" HEAR act / "act" / "act" ≡ *SELF* *result +*
P4: Proud of self as competent agent. Child carries out action with positive goal-related results that are evaluated as special, attributes result to self and labels it using evaluative category. For example, child may throw a ball and make an appraisal like "I throw good!" On success, parent evaluates child verbally and in gesture, smiles; praises child with exaggerated voice. Child's celebratory action tendency includes smile, social referencing, positive self-evaluation, expanding posture (2 ½ - 3 yrs).	**Sm4/Rp1: SINGLE REPRESENTATIONS** grasp ACT ↔ let go GOAL ↔ seen MOM move arm / see ball fly / heard ⇕ own body SEE ↔ "I" SAY ↔ "I" HEAR outcome / "good" / "good" ≡ *SELF* *good*	**S/H4: Quiet pride in meeting other's expectations**. Child carries out action to conform to parent's goal and connects outcome and parent's modest evaluation of child's ongoing effort and attributes the outcome to the self. Child makes appraisal like "I am doing o.k." Relatives praise child effusively ("Wonderful!"), but parent provides modest praise ("She sings *hai hou*"), effaces outcome to relatives ("No, she just barely finished!"), and tells child to play down her accomplishment ("*hai-hou*").	grasp ACT ↔ give candy M's GOAL ↔ smile MOM move arm / G'ma eat / "hai-hao" ⇕ own body SEE ↔ "I" SAY ↔ me ACT outcome / "act" / no talk ≡ *SELF* *keep going*

P5: Pride over comparative performance. Child judges her performance in a valued area as better than or as good as another's. A child may throw a ball farther than or as far as a valued other. Child makes appraisal like "I can throw farther than [other child]!" Child celebrates self (3 ½ to 4 years).	**Rp2: REPRESENTATIONAL MAPPINGS** 	**S/H5: Modest accomplishment**. Child carries out parent's goal for Grandma (e.g., sings song learned in school), attributes result to self, but is aware of discrepancy between Grandma's praise and parent's effacement. Child makes appraisal like "I sang well for Grandma but must stay quiet."	
P6: Proud of concrete valued trait. Child compares concrete performances in several contexts and coordinates them into a concrete trait that earns social approval of others. For example, child compares her positive performance in field hockey and soccer and is aware connects this to positive evaluations by others. Child celebrates self. (6-7 years)	**Rp3: REPRESENTATIONAL SYSTEMS** 	**S/H6: Concrete self-effacing social honor.** Child is aware that teacher praises both self and mother for child's effortful learning. Given his awareness of need for piety (*ting-hau*) and that his parent approves of his learning but expects more (*hai-hao*), child is modest (quiet). Child makes appraisal like "My learning has brought praise to mother. She is pleased, but I must keep learning and be modest." This is supported by teacher's actual praising of mother and self, and by mom's self-effacing comments about child.	
P7: Pride over generalized personality characteristic. You person judges himself or herself to have two or more concrete traits that are valued by others, generalizes across these traits to characterize the self's identity positively. For example, adolescent may be aware of social approval earned by performing well in sports and academics. Child abstracts across traits and concludes, "I am a competent person" or something similar. (10-12 years)	**Rp4/Ab1: SINGLE ABSTRACTIONS** 	**S/H7: Generalized self-effacing social honor**. Child is aware that through her positive effort she has brought honor to her parents and/or family. Aware of the support she has received in making her accomplishment, she shows modesty and resolves to keep trying hard in school. Child's appraisal is socially supported by multiple other's explicit praise of mother and self, and by parent's self-effacing comments about child.	
P8: Pride in general characteristic of other person with identity related to one's own. Person judges another person of an identity similar to his or her own to have a desirable characteristic and relates own identity to that attribute. A person may judge someone else to be especially competent (e.g., singing). Linking his own ethnic identity to that of the other, he might say "I've never had such pride in seeing this [name of race] woman stand up there with this great royal dignity and sing!" (15+ yrs)	**Ab2: ABSTRACT MAPPINGS** 	**S/H8: Self-harmonizing social honor**. Child is aware that his generalized positive efforts have brought honor to his family, attributes the outcome to his family, and effaces the self's contribution to the outcome. An adolescent makes an appraisal like: "My family is honored even though I am unworthy of your praise."	

Table 3
Development of Chinese Shame/Guilt

Level of Emotional Experience	Appraisal Skill Structure	Emotional Actions	Role of Other in Co-Regulation of Emotion	Sample Episode
S/G1: Affective misattunement. Distress over inability to maintain expected emotional exchange with caregiver (7-9 months).	**LEVEL Sm2: SENSORI-MOTOR MAPPINGS** **LOOK** (mother) —— **GOAL +** (see smile)	Gaze aversion	Parent does not engage child in expected facial exchange. She may exhibit neutral or negative facial or vocal expressions.	Infant directs gaze to parent, who, distracted for whatever reason, fails to provide wanted or expected emotional display. Infant looks away in distress.
S/G2: Early social distress. Distress over caregiver's negative emotional reaction to child's unwillingness to perform a requested social act (12-13 months).	**LEVEL Sm3: SENSORI-MOTOR SYSTEMS** look mom, Gra'ma — hear coax **ME** ⟷ **MOTHER** no give candy — see head shake, frown	Gaze aversion	Caregiver alternates her attention between Grandma and child. To Grandma, with a embarrassed smile, she says "*Aiya*, Jin won't share her candy!" With a frown, she shakes her head sadly and says to child "I have a child who won't share with Grandma!"	To encourage respect to elders, caregiver tries to coax unwilling infant to share her candy with her grandma. Caregiver's coaxing directs child's attention to her failure to give up candy. Caregiver's words, emotion and vocal tone convey disapproval; child looks away.
S/G3: Self-conscious social distress. Child attributes responsibility to self for action (or failure to act) that brings about affective disapproval by others. Child makes appraisal like "Me no give candy" or "Mom unhappy with me." (18-24 months).	**LEVEL Sm4/Rp1: SINGLE REPRESENTATIONS** look mother — head shake, frown **ACT** ⟷ **MOTHER** look Grandma — hear coax ⇕ grasp candy — says 'me no share' **ACT** ⟷ **MOTHER** see own hands — 'aiya, my child is..' ≡ *ME* *no give to Gra'ma*	Gaze aversion; look down; run and hide; cry; distressed or anxious face.	Caregiver responds much as above, but begins to describe child in terms of evaluative social categories, e.g., she says to Grandma in a self-effacing way: "*Aiya*, I am a mother of a child who is *buguai*." Though child does not fully understand such terms, they orient her to social values of respect and duty, which develop later.	Same as above, however, child is able to represent himself as a causal agent who fails to give candy to grandma as requested, or who makes mom unhappy, or something similar. Child is aware of other's negative evaluations, but does not yet represent self or self's actions in terms of inner standards or concrete social categories.
S/G4: Shame over negative characterization of social self. Child sees self through eyes of others and views self in terms of an unwanted social category (e.g., *buguai*). Child makes appraisal like "Me *buguai*" or "Me *buguai* for not giving candy" (2 ½-3 yrs) .	**LEVEL Sm4/Rp1: SINGLE REPRESENTATIONS** look mom — say 'have filial piety **ACT** ⟷ **MOTHER** look Gra'ma — say 'embarrassed' ⇕ grasp candy — say 'me *buguai*' **ACT** ⟷ **GRANDMA** see own hands — head shake, etc. ≡ *G'MA/ME* *thinks…buguai*	Look down or away; remain quiet; run and hide; cry; distressed or anxious face.	Caregiver invokes cultural value of filial piety to coax child to share candy with grandma ("Have filial piety with Grandma!") Caregiver makes increasingly strong evaluative discriminations in child's behavior ("I am embarrassed in front of grandma when you don't share!").	Same as above, although now child begins to represent self in terms of concrete evaluative standards and categories. The child's shameful self is defined in terms of a representation that incorporates both self and other, e.g., how *grandma* feels and categorizes self (*buguai*).

S/G5: Differentiated social shame. Child understands the causal relation between her own poor learning and her mother's embarrassed reaction. Child can make an appraisal like: "I embarrassed mother because I didn't try hard enough." (3 ½ – 4 years).	**LEVEL Rp2: REPRESENTATIONAL MAPPINGS** 	Look down or away; remain quiet; run and hide; cry.	Caregiver has child sing for guests, stressing the import of performing well: "Sing 'twinkle twinkle,' not 'tinkle tinkle'…" When child sings poorly, caregiver says to guest, "She didn't practice hard." The guest offers self-effacing praise: "No, she did better than my child would!"	Chinese parents typically have children demonstrate skill from school to relatives or guests. A caregiver may ask the child to sing a newly learned song. At this level, the child is aware that his poor learning causes embarrassment in the mother, who is self-effacing with relatives and guests.

S/G6: Social comparative shame. Child engages in social comparison of concrete acts. Child feels shame when she realizes that her friend's drawing is better than her own; mother states that her child did not practice as hard as friend. Child makes an appraisal like "Mother is embarrassed that Lin can draw better than me." (3 ½ - 5 years)		Look down; cry; say "her drawing is nice but mine isn't"; run and hide; remain quiet and withdrawn.	Mother may say " Of course Lin made a nicer picture! She practiced hard!" Mother may say to friend's parent, "My child didn't practice enough." Friend's parent would say in self-effacing way, "No, she did a fine job!"	A child and his friend are drawing pictures with their parents present. The friend's draws a picture that is better than the self's. Child is able to compare the value of his drawing to the friends. Parent states that friend practiced more than her child. Child is ashamed of poor comparative learning in mother's eyes.
S/G7: Concrete internalized social shame. Viewing the self through the eyes of the mother, a child realizes he exhibits a negative moral quality (disobedience), which causes embarrassment to the parent. Child appraises: "Mother is embarrassed and upset with me because I don't practice like she wants me to." (6-7 yrs).	**LEVEL Rp3: REPRESENTATIONAL SYSTEMS** 	Look down or away; remain quiet; hide; cry; resolve to fix situation; effort to improve skill and uphold concrete standards of obedience; works to please parents.	While "scratching her face with her finger in shame," a caregiver says to child, "Shame on you! You did not practice enough! I feel embarrassed when you teacher comes!" "If you don't study, people will laugh!" Such statements are typically made in front of both child and others and are accompanied by strong affect.	With the onset of the "age of reason," children are held to stringent moral standards (filial piety, hard work in learning). With poor learning, parents communicate embarrassment. At this level, a child can represent relations between his actual and ideal levels of effort in school with his parent's expectations and emotions.
S/G8: Shame over social dishonor. An adolescent can construct single abstractions of aspects of his moral character in the eyes of his parents. In realizing that his poor learning and lack of filial piety prompts lack of face in his parents, the child can make an abstract appraisal like "I brought dishonor upon my self and my parents."(10-12 years**)**.	**LEVEL Rp4/Ab1: SINGLE ABSTRACTIONS** 	Looks down; quiet; resolves to cultivate self by upholding filial piety and *hao-xue-xin*; self-cultivation is not valued through verbalization but instead through changed action.	In light of poor learning in school, both parents communicate their displeasure and "sense of shame" over the child's lack of hao-xue-xin and filial piety.	Given poor learning in school and actual/anticipated feedback from both mother and father, the adolescent generalizes across multiple actual and anticipated interactions with significant others to construct an abstract sense of sense of shame over "having no *hao-xue-xin*," "having no filial piety," and/or bringing dishonor to parents.

S/G9: Abstract self/familial shame. Adolescent can form abstract interpretation of how her moral failing bestows dishonor to self and family: "My lack of *hao-xue-xin* has brought dishonor to my family" (14 – 16 years.)	**LEVEL Ab2: ABSTRACT MAPPINGS** 	Approaches parents to express shame and intention to change behavior; Declares intention to model self on honorable social figures; may weep; may kneel in front of parents and swear to change behavior.	Parent may say "Shame on you! You show no *hao-xue-xin*! No filial piety!" "Our community will avoid you, laugh at you." "People will call you 'lazy,' 'disrespectful,' 'shameless,' 'no filial piety'. Parents indicate that if child changes behavior, they will provide support and all will be forgiven; laughing will cease.	Given poor outcome in school, adolescent is able to construct a reflective awareness that his lack of hao-xue-xin or filial piety is the source of dishonor brought to family.
SS/G10: Generalized social shame. Self's lack of face in multiple domains (e.g., *lian* and *mianzi*) brings dishonor to abstract social groups (19-20 yrs+).	**LEVEL Ab3: ABSTRACT SYSTEMS** 	Public declarations of shame; Public apologies and declared intentions to change behavior; Writing letters to friends, authorities apologizing for shameful event; public or private weeping.	Symbolized social and ritualistic activities; social punishment from others, e.g., others distance themselves from the self until and unless individual changes behavior (reintegration)	Young or older adult may experience failure of *mianzi* (social prestige, respect, dignity,) and *lian* (everyday moral duty; honor) and which bring dishonor to multiple generalized others, such as one's extended family and nation. Such failings could involve inability to make skillful or scholarly contributions to society; breaking up extended families through divorce; failing at an international competition; failure in self-cultivation, etc.

Figure 1. Emotion Process



Figure 2. Cluster Analysis of Basic Emotion Families in Chinese and English



Note: The subordinate families are from the Chinese study (Shaver, Wu, & Schwartz, 1992).

Figure 3. Cluster Analysis of Chinese Shame Families



Source: Wang, Fischer, & Li, 2000

Figure 4: Cultural Organization of Pride, Shame, and Guilt in USA and China



Figure 5. Web Metaphor for Developmental Pathways



Source: Adapted from Fischer & Bidell, 1998